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The state of Jammu and Kashmir in India was revoked of its autonomous status in 5th 
August, 2019, by the Indian government on the grounds of rising terrorism in the territory. 
The thesis aims to analyse the actual motive behind the revocation of Article 370, the 
constitutional provision that secures Kashmir’s autonomy, through the application of 
securitisation theory. By applying the theory to the case, the thesis plans to show how the 
ruling Indian government securitised the state of Kashmir by creating a ‘state of 
exception’. The chosen method to analyse the empiric is Discourse Analysis; materials 
chosen for analysis consists of public speeches made by members from the ruling political 
party. The empirical analysis is achieved by studying public speeches made by key 
leaders of the members from the ruling Indian government. It is divided into three themes: 
securitisation of Muslims, Modi’s speeches on terrorism, and securitisation of Kashmir. 
The thesis concludes by stating the key findings that have been established from the 
analysis of the case.  
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The state of Jammu and Kashmir is located in northern India and is a disputed territory 
between India and Pakistan. The state had to choose between joining either India or 
Pakistan after the British withdrew from India in 1947. Kashmir’s ruler at the time, Raja 
Hari Singh was faced with the dilemma as the state was predominantly Muslim but was 
governed by a Hindu ruler (Mukherjee, 2016). Kashmir acceded to India after Raja Hari 
Singh signed the Instrument of Accession (IoA) with India after armed tribesmen from 
Pakistan invaded the state. By signing the IoA, India was vested with the authority in 
areas of defence, communications, and external affairs, while Kashmir retained autonomy 
in all other areas (Agarwala, 2016). Article 370 developed out of a necessity; it was 
established that the relationship between India and Jammu and Kashmir will be guided 
by the IoA, therefore, a special provision was created in the Indian Constitution to 
accommodate Kashmir, thus giving rise to Article 370 (ibid). Under Article 370, Kashmir 
was thus granted its own Constitution, judiciary, legislature, and executive. It should be 
mentioned that the Article cannot be abrogated or amended because constitutional 
amendment in relation to Jammu and Kashmir can only take place by the President’s 
order under Article 370 (Peer and Rahman, 2012). Along with this the additional Article 
35A, which stems from Article 370, was introduced through a Presidential Order in 1954 
and it prevented non-state subjects (non-J&K residents) from buying immovable property 
and applying to jobs in the state (Majid, 2019).  
5th August 2019 marked the significant event when the Indian government, 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomous status by 
revoking Article 370 and Article 35A. Along with that, it also announced that the state 
would now be divided into two separate territories both of which will be administered by 
the central government (Medha, 2019). The BJP government has increased security along 
the Line of Control (LoC) along with restricting telecommunications and media services 
and increased stationing of army in the state. These drastic decisions were justified on the 
grounds of retaliation from terror groups and other related casualties (Jacob, 2020). The 
abrogation of Article 370 was deemed unconstitutional. According to the Indian 
constitution, Article 370 can only be repealed if the President of India issues a notification 
based on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly. However, the Constituent 
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Assembly has now been dissolved, thus rendering this scope inoperative. Therefore, in 
order to abrogate the autonomous status, the Parliament has to pass a bill amending the 
Constitution, this amendment has to be ‘passed by two-thirds of the members present and 
voting and absolute majority of the total membership in each house of Parliament (Sathe, 
1990). The Indian government, without engaging in any consultation with the leaders of 
Kashmir, proceeded to put Kashmir under severe lockdown stating that there is a looming 
terrorist threat. Former chief ministers of the state Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti, 
were also taken into preventive custody. Although though Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
has the required majority to pass the amendment in Parliament, it chose not to do so 
(Medha, 2019).  
 The underlying conflict of Kashmir is that of separatism and self-determination. 
The separatist movements can be traced back to 1980s when Kashmiri Muslims’ agitation 
increased against the state and central leaders due to the Indian National Congress’s (INC, 
central government) involvement in vote fraud in the state (Ganguly, 2001). The state 
government, National Conference (NC) was dismissed by INC in 1984 and was forced to 
form an alliance with INC, the rigged 1987 election further agitated Kashmiri Muslims 
which then led to greater demands for secession (ibid). It is from this point onwards, 
1989-2002, that Kashmir saw intense violence. Militant organisations, which used to be 
secular nationalist in nature like the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), took 
a radical turn towards Islamist militancy like the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), who were also backed by Pakistan (Lalwani and Gayner, 2020). 
Thus, the insurgency of 1988-89 was followed by an increased Indian counterinsurgency 
(Staniland, 2013). In the speech Narendra Modi made on 7th August, right after the 
abrogation, he blamed Article 370 and 35A for being a ‘tool to spread terrorism and 
violence in the state and that it has been an obstruction to the state’s development1. 
However, given that the Article allows Jammu and Kashmir autonomy in all aspects 
except defence, foreign affairs, and communication, which happens to be under the 
central government’s authority, questions arise regarding BJP’s actual motive behind the 
revocation. The autonomy has already been reduced to a nominal status due to the 
 





increased militarisation in the state, leading to fear amongst the citizens that main aim of 
the revocation was to change the demography, which was possible due to the nullification 
of Article 35A2, since it is the only Muslim majority state in India (Medha, 2019).  
 The aim of the thesis is to analyse the motive behind the revocation of Article 370 
by the BJP government from a securitisation point of view.  Securitisation is defined as: 
 
‘when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object. The 
special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them’ (Buzan 
et. al. 1998, p. 21) 
The research questions that the thesis aims to answer are:  
 
• What explains the revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy?  
• How have speech acts enabled securitisation of anti-Hindu elements in Indian 
society and justified the measures taken in the case of “state of exception”?  
 
To answer the research questions, the thesis will look into how a state of exception was 
created in the case of Kashmir by BJP through the application of securitisation theory. 
This is achieved by analysing video interviews and speeches made by key BJP leaders, 
and BJP election manifesto from 2014 and 2019. Therefore, the chosen methodology to 
analyse the empirics is discourse analysis. The reason being, through discourse analysis, 
we can see how the language that one uses can ‘bring forward the importance of political 
agencies the identity that its constructs’ (Hansen, 2006). Therefore, discourse analysis 
was applied to analyse speeches of BJP leaders in order to explain how it aided in the 
creation and legitimisation of the securitisation of Kashmir. The empirical portion is 
divided into three parts: securitisation of Muslims, Modi’s speeches on terrorism, and 
securitisation of Kashmir. The aim is to show how the BJP, through speeches, was able 
to successfully securitise Kashmir by assessing its relationship with the Muslims of India 
and its overall policies on terrorism.  
Due to the fact that the Kashmir conflict has been continuing ever since India 
received independence in 1947, its complicated nature has been studied by scholars who 
have tried to explain the root causes of the conflict which could be traced back to ethnic, 
 
2 “Article 35A: Why a special law on Kashmir is Controversial”, 5th August 2019, BBC 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-40897522 
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religious, territorial disparities along with hyper nationalism and economic reform 
(Ganguly and Bajpai, 1994). While some other have written extensively on the growing 
insurgency in the state which was met with an increasing Indian counterinsurgency (see 
e.g., Staniland, 2013). The Kashmiri separatism became louder as more and more young 
men and women began to join secular movements like the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation 
Front (JKLF) as well as religiously motivated Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) which was 
backed by Pakistan (Staniland, 2013). Studies have also been conducted on how the 
Kashmiri conflict and violence has evolved into a more “quasi-violence” which has seen 
a rise in stone-pelting, interdictions of security operations, and militant funerals (Lalwani 
and Gayner, 2020). Further, the additional conflict between India and Pakistan, which 
also happens to be two nuclear powers, have been a constant obstruction to peacemaking. 
Plus, the process of peacemaking is top-down and elitist that is bent on nationalist 
ambitions and territory and borders (Richmond and Tellidis, 2012).  
 Applying securitisation theory to the Kashmir crisis will help broaden the scope 
and thus contribute towards its development. Kapur (2017), has shown how the 
securitisation theory can be applied to the surgical strikes of 2016 in Kashmir. She, 
however, posits that her application of the theory onto the case defies ‘securitisation 
theory’s chronological structure’, which states that a speech act is followed by an 
exceptional policy implementation/measure. Language-games have been applied on 
speeches, and interviews delivered by Modi that articulate Islamophobia, thus suggesting 
it might have made its way through to the Hindu mainstream (Waikar, 2018). The thesis 
thus aims to fill the gap in literature by applying securitisation theory to the case of 
revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy by analysing speeches made by BJP leaders that 
securitise Muslims, emphasis on counterterrorism measures, and securitise Kashmir by 
bringing it to a state of exception. The structure of the thesis will be the following: Chapter 
1 is the literature review that examines the various approaches that scholars have written 
about in the case of securitisation theory. Chapter 2 briefly explains the research design 
and the methodology used for the thesis. Chapter 3 analyses speeches by BJP leaders 
which have been categorised into three types: speeches made to securitise Muslims, 
Modi’s speeches on terrorism, and speeches made to securitise Kashmir, and a brief 
portion on the major takeaways from the analysis. Lastly, the conclusion wraps up by 
stating the aim of the study and how it was achieved.   
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1. Theoretical Background 
 
1.1. Critical Security Studies and the Case of Emancipation   
 
Critical security studies- a stream of security studies came into focus after Cold War when 
problem solving approaches were rejected. The aim of this field of security study is to 
imagine and construct the world in a different way, in ways which the traditional notions 
of security, mainly that of national interests, were rejected by theorists. Thereby, 
replacing states with individuals as the referent object, making the people the ‘ends’ and 
states ‘means’, thus giving birth the concept of emancipation (Hynek and Chandler, 
2013). What critical does is it emphasises on the need to broaden the scope of security 
further from the state in order to include other actors and sectors than just the military. 
Therefore, it brings into consideration other referent objects which allows for a more 
Realist understanding of international security as it places importance on both domestic 
and trans-border threats (Vennesson, 2017). Coming back to point of emancipation, the 
main agenda of critical security is to perceive security as ‘emancipation’, thus having a 
strong ethical ground. This is because, the proponents of the theory believe power and 
order to produce at the cost of others. Emancipation on the other hand promotes the idea 
that unless everyone is free no one is truly free (Bourne and Bulley, 2011).  
As one of the major proponents of the theory, Ken Booth (1991), describes 
emancipation, he insists that emancipation is a means to free people from those 
constraints (physical and human) that obstructs their end goal of free will. Therefore, 
security and emancipation are basically interlinked. Thereby indicating that states, and 
not individuals, are ‘means’ and not ends (Booth, 1991). However, security is not just the 
free-will of the individuals, it is described as a progress which proceeds towards a greater 
humanitarian goal. This points to the idea that autonomy and self-realisation is achievable 
within a community which is rooted in ideas and ethics. It avoids the idea of ‘mono-
factoral labelling’ based on ethnicity, religion etc, and instead strives for an overlapping 
emancipatory community wherein individuals coexist in multifaceted lives (Bourne and 
Bulley, 2011). Booth further states that in order to understand world politics better, 
moving away from neo-realism might be helpful if done so through the lens of 
emancipation. He mentions the importance of critical theory and how it contributes in the 
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present state by bringing about the idea that politics is open-ended and its roots are in 
ethics, thereby turning the strategic understanding of inter-state politics towards moral 
philosophy (Booth, 1991).  
 However, not every theorist agrees with the emancipatory concept of Booth. Ever 
since 2001 (War on Terror), the need for emancipatory measures have reduced drastically 
as it paved the way for modernist and liberal approaches. Hynek and Chandler (2013) 
argue that much of what is known as critical security studies presently has very little to 
do with emancipation. This is because the current theorists of emancipation question the 
‘Western understandings of emancipation’ and are attempting to break away from it as 
they recognise that there might be an issue with which actors are considered emancipators 
in this situation. One of the major reasons why this problem with critical security might 
exist could be the fact that since its conception, the theory focused on the idea that 
emancipatory actor/agency can survive independently without an emancipatory subject. 
It can, however, be understood as a struggle for, and therefore a guide to, the 
emancipatory actors (counter-hegemonic) to stand up to the hierarchies of power, since it 
was introduced into security studies as the dominant counter-hegemonic power had 
collapsed (Hynek and Chandler, 2013).  
 Similarly, Bourne and Bulley (2011) too, disagree with the emancipatory theory 
by claiming that the way forward towards security is through non-emancipatory measures 
that accepts authoritarian forms of security where the possibility to flourish comes pre-
defined. Further, their argument is that priority should be given to insecurity. They point 
out the flaws in the theory by applying it to the case of Kosovo. The critical security 
theory did not stand the test of time in the case of humanitarian containment which failed 
to bring relief to the refugees. The refugees also suffered immense insecurity and there 
was not much in terms of emancipation or autonomy. This is contrary to what the theory 
suggests- that is emancipation is when the population is saved from insecurity and have 
the right to a dignified life (Bourne and Bulley, 2011). In response to the above-mentioned 
critique of the theory, Booth in turn believes it is pointless implanting his theory word for 
word like a recipe book looking for precise prescriptions of solutions. This is because 
when a theory is tested against a particular case, it might be that the proponents 
themselves arrive at different conclusions and that it in no way challenges the legitimacy 
of the theory neither does it render it invalid. His disagreement at Bourne and Bulley’s 
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critique that Booth believes that with a proper ‘road map’ it is impossible to get lost and 
thus providing the traveller security. Booth insists that ‘recipes and road map’ might 
suggest ideas but it in no way guarantees that the end goal will be reached (Booth, 2011).  
 It is because of the critical security that the Copenhagen School of Security later 
adopted the term critical security study in its name. However, one of the biggest 
differences and advantage was the fact that the emancipatory theory was dropped and its 
scope was broadened as it began focusing on securitisation. The proponents of 
Copenhagen School were against the emancipatory theory and its intense focus on human 
security. They also rejected the emancipation on grounds of its empirical approach that 
preferred an impartial response as opposed to a policy solution. Secondly, they also 
opposed to referent object being an individual as opposed to the state against the 
construction of threats. Third, the view that emancipation was perceived as something 
that was achieved through the successful securitisation wherein emancipation was 
securitised was not something that Copenhagen School agreed with (Hynek and 
Chandler, 2013).  
 
 
1.2 Branching Out – Copenhagen School  
 
One of the most important proponents of Copenhagen School of security studies, Barry 
Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, have expanded the concept further after branching 
from critical security. According to them, security is about survival and can be understood 
from the traditional military-political lens. When extraordinary measures are justified 
regarding an issue that is presented as an existential threat, it is defined as securitisation 
(Buzan et al. 1998). It is when the issue of security is being used to legitimise use of force 
and thereby making way for the state to implement measures and special powers to 
combat the threats. The state thus creates an emergency situation which allows it to use 
whatever means necessary to block or curb the threat (ibid). This school focuses mainly 
on the middle level of securitisation- which is the collective political actors who construct 
their securitisations against each other” (Buzan and Wæver, 2009).  
 One of the key features of this theory is that it is a speech act wherein the utterance 
of specific securitising terms is used to construct the reality of security. Hansen (2011) 
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states that the core understanding of security lies in post-structuralism that considers it a 
speech act and self-referential practise which creates something to be a security issue. 
Further, it is also considered that language, although is structured, can also be unstable. 
Securitisation is therefore a ‘discursive formation’ which includes political system of 
dispersion involving states of threats or defence, referent objects and thematic choices 
(ibid). However, speech act has been questioned on the grounds of it being ‘decisionist’ 
wherein the security is characterised as ‘imposition of will’ which points to the idea that 
politics rests within the actor’s motivation. It is understood as an act where the audience 
does not belong in the production of the meaning of the speech itself therefore, the success 
of a speech act is considered an ‘effect’ which is inseparable from the ‘intention’ of the 
speaker (Pram Gad and Lund Petersen, 2011). Thus, the meanings that are to be analysed 
can be found in the texts and not the author because the meanings, intentions, and acts 
only make sense when it is analysed against or in relation to other texts (ibid). Buzan and 
Wæver (1998) further state that in order to study securitisation, it is not necessary to study 
the indicators, rather it is the discourse and political constellations. Along with this they 
write that in order for an actor to present something as an existential threat, mere discourse 
only makes it a ‘securitising move’, it is up to the audience to accept it and only then is 
the issue securitised.  
  Buzan and Wæver (1998), state that if survival of collective units and politics of 
existential threats are placed into the theory of security studies then it can be applied to 
multiple sectors at the same time retaining its central claim. For them, security is a generic 
term and existential threat cannot be same in different sectors. Further, they also mention 
that the idea of sector in security developed out of the Cold War backdrop where more 
agendas and issues were added to the military-political concept (Buzan et.al, 1998). This 
is because if security is to be considered in wider terms it might be helpful to take into 
account sectors and what they mean as they make the scope of inquiry more manageable 
by reducing variables. A political realist focuses on sovereignty and power, and how an 
actor is motivated to maximise their power. Whereas a military strategist will instead 
focus on offensive and defensive capability and how the actor is motivated through 
opportunity of coercive advantage (ibid). However, it is with the Copenhagen school’s 
idea that the reality of threat is subjective, mainly arising from the actors understanding 
whether the threat actually exists or not. This makes it difficult to analyse what counts as 
 14 
an ‘actual’ threat compared to a perceived threat. This stand discounts the consideration 
that threat and its perception require urgent action and when these urgencies are 
challenged, democracy suffers a blow (Knudsen, 2001).  
 This can be understood better if we look at Hansen’s suggestion regarding security 
and threat. If the content of discursive elements is highlighted better in the given case. 
This is because according to Buzan an actor does not necessarily utter the word ‘security’ 
to make claims of security. The actor might use words that are not synonyms of ‘security’ 
thus not invoking the ‘political modality’. By linking security theory with post-
structuralist theory, it is possible to understand how security is invoked through the use 
of signs and symbols within texts and discourses (Hansen, 2011). As Wæver writes, 
securitisation is the process through which threat is managed, therefore security lies 
within the management of the existing threat and not the other way round. However, it is 
inevitable that while discussing security there is going to be a discussion of threat, which 
is why it is important to develop ‘discourse ethics’ that justifies securitisation. In order 
for a threat argument to make sense and perform, a constructive mobilisation of the theory 
is required that confirms the presence of a threat that is existential and its possible 
advantages of managing it through security measures as opposed to non-security 
measures (Wæver, 2011).  
McSweeney, in his review of the Copenhagen school, critically analyses the 
central concepts and ideas of society and security. He poses the question asking why the 
concept of identity is chosen when there are countless other values that can contribute to 
societies collectivity. He goes on to critique Buzan and Wæver’s idea of identity by 
saying that there is not enough argument presented by them that explains as so why 
‘society’s survival is a matter of identity’ (1996). Further, he disapproves of how Buzan 
and Wæver have not cleared the point that economic threats to the society can affect its 
security. Another aspect of Copenhagen school that has been criticised is the fact that it 
does not mention or gets involved in the military sector, thus moving away from the large-
scale conflict studies (Knudsen, 2001). While Knudsen agrees that one of the most 
popular idea of the Copenhagen school was that of non-military threats, he stresses that 
this notion was relevant during the end of Cold War when it was believed that military 
will no longer hold importance in Europe. The central argument of securitisation thus 
claims that the basis of national security lies not within the nature of it but rather how the 
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politicians define and present it. Knudsen (2001) insists it is relevant only if we think of 
it in the context of Cold War.  
 
1.3 Securitisation  
 
When an issue is raised from the ordinary and given priority and is used to receive the 
audience’s legitimation, it is defined as securitisation. This provides the actors 
(securitisers) the authority to manage the issue the way they deem fit (Balzacq et al. 
2015). As mentioned before, security worked best during and early post-Cold War period 
when the construction of security was brought to light. Despite the difference between 
critical approaches, one of the common aspects of security is the fact that it is socially 
constructed. Therefore, what constitutes ‘threat’ is not something that has specific 
guidelines but rather something that has been ascribed by the actors. This is why it gives 
the political actors/state elites the power to speak of security and justify extraordinary 
measures that is beyond democratic measures (Bilgin, 2018). Often, literatures try to link 
security with depoliticization. What happens in depoliticization is that a political 
character is refuted and the topic is moved away from the narrative of controversial 
discussion. How security is linked with depoliticization is because security, even though 
is considered political, can be said to place a ‘constrain on democratic politics that closes 
down public debates and political contestation and limits the range of legitimate arenas, 
actors, and arguments’ (Hagmann et al. 2018). However, in some ways it can also be 
politicised as securitisation mainly deals with securitisation of actors through the use of 
language and its implementation. In this way, security is not a constraint on politics 
because of speech acts but through the use of inaccessible bureaucratic routines when it 
comes to managing everyday insecurities (ibid).  
 Politicisation and desecuritisation have one thing in thing in common, that is the 
central theme of ‘political’ or, ‘how an ideal of democratic deliberation stands in contrast 
to less desirable forms of politics’ (Cavelty and Leese, 2018). Although securitisation 
focuses on the ‘urgency’ of a situation, depoliticization instead focuses on improving 
economic efficiency. The role and responsibility of the elected politicians are deflected 
by removing the decision-making part from politics in the case of depoliticization. This 
then leads to undermined accountability and liberal ideals of inclusive debates. While it 
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is argued that depoliticization of government can make it more efficient, scholars agree 
that politicisation is a better strategy instead as through this the taken-for-granted details 
are exposed making the government more politically obligated and responsible (ibid). An 
interesting understanding of effects depoliticization has over popular security issues is 
expressed by Rythoven (2018). He writes that the general idea revolving around security 
is that when subjected to discourse and debate, it might obstruct urgent countermeasures. 
Dissent is seen as failing to support the troops while fear makes it easier for 
depoliticization to take place as it narrows the scope of controversy thus reducing 
democratic content from security (Rythoven, 2018). The Copenhagen school mentions 
that securitisation is like politicisation in the sense that it is an intersubjective process and 
that even if the objective approach seemed more reasonable, it is difficult to understand 
how it can be done unless the threat is unambiguous and immediate. It is tough to say 
whether a security issue is an ‘actual’ threat since it will require an objective measure 
which has not been provided by security schools. While not the same, but on a similar 
note, Rythoven points out that there is lack of focus on the role of emotions in 
politicisation literatures. He presents an important argument because most of the 
politicised issues turn into intense debates because of their underlying emotional centre 
(Rythoven, 2018).  
 One of the most prominent claims of securitisation is that it pictures security 
objectively, but at the same time it is also subjective wherein the actor can perceive 
security issues the way they deem fit. Questions have been raised on both approaches. 
While objective outlook does not fix insecurity because of a lack of unambiguous input 
into behaviour, subjectivist approach points out that if everything is constructed by the 
securitising actor then in the end anything could be termed a threat (Guzzini, 2011). 
Securitisation in this case is seen as ‘conscious political choice’ wherein the actor makes 
a decision that suspends the normal politics of the state. Thus, security is mostly 
subjective wherein the actor classifying an issue as a security threat is making a political 
decision thus holding the actor responsible for the consequences (Kaliber, 2005). Issues 
are securitised through the use of languages that actors use to categorise a situation as an 
existential threat, thus justifying the need for extraordinary measures. The success also 
depends on how the securitising actor is able to connect with the audience by engaging 
with them and their experiences and emotions (Balzacq, 2005). Further, because the 
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securitisation does not take place in vacuum, it is important to realise that it 
interconnected to other instances and circumstances as well. when multiple securitising 
moves take place over time, it is possible to secure the audience’s acceptance (Côté, 
2016). Language becomes security through the use (the way it is written or spoken) of 
specific words that constitute security. However, this practise has been called out for two 
reasons: one, language one of the many other means of communication, for example the 
role of images can have massive impact and influence on securitisation. Two, this 
excessive focus and stress on language thereby ignores and side-lines other means and 
forms of bureaucratic practises and actions that although do not simply follow security 
speech acts but contribute meanings of security. Another important aspect about this 
second point worth mentioning is the fact that by incorporating visual mediums into 
securitisation, one has to make way for other contending actors that are beyond political 
actors. Thus, challenging the theory by raising complicated questions about agency 
(McDonald, 2008).  
 Critics of the Copenhagen school raise objection over the ‘undesirability’ of the 
theories refusal/failure to deal with normal politics. This is because politics is understood 
to be discussed routinely without elevating it to the category of specific threats (Roe, 
2012). Everyday routine politics is counted as ‘normal’ politics. Policymaking takes place 
in accordance with pre-established guidelines and measures are marked and carried out 
through debates and deliberations in liberal democracies (normal politics), thus allowing 
room for scrutiny. On the other hand, the urgency state of operations in security speech 
act demands for actions that quick because otherwise human survival will be threatened. 
It can be understood as ‘elite politics’ because it benefits them through lack of scrutiny, 
wherein judicial review or public interferences are suspended. This makes the 
government unaccountable for its deeds, which in turn proves to be disastrous for 
democracy (ibid). However, even though the theory takes politics out of the ordinary, 
mundane routine it is nevertheless vulnerable to subjectivity and illegitimacy. This is 
because of the theory’s emphasis on existential threat that automatically elevates the issue 
by dramatizing thus giving it ultimate priority compared to other everyday issues. It seeks 
legitimacy from audiences thus justifying the extraordinary measures (Kaliber, 2005).  
 An important aspect of the security theory is the presence of a facilitating 
condition that enables a securitising move to become successful. In other words, instead 
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of coming up with what a speech/text means, it focuses on how the meaning is created 
and produced socially. As Guzzini (2011) writes, ‘security is understood not through its 
substance but through its performance: securitisation’. The process of speech act is 
incomplete without the ‘consent or support of particular constituencies’ (McDonald, 
2008). Here the role of the audience becomes important. This is where the 
intersubjectivity aspect of the theory comes into picture. Whether an issue is successfully 
securitised or not depends on not just the securitiser but also the audience who has to 
accept the act. What is not made explicit by the Copenhagen school regarding this is the 
fact that regardless of how securitisation is achieved, the negotiation methods through 
which the approval is achieved are unclear (like the role of media, legal sanctions, and 
restrictions applied by securitising actor) (Kaliber, 2005). This can be understood by how 
Buzan and Wæver explain the role of the actor (securitiser). How a securitiser securitises 
an issue has real consequences, and because the actor will behave differently than he 
would have under normal circumstances, it is important for them to ‘understand the 
threshold at which other actors will feel threatened’ (Buzan et al. 1998). How the 
securitising actor responds and acts to existential threats also sends across a message to 
the actors thus influencing their next move. This is why, what seems legitimate and 
obvious to one state looks breach of legitimacy to another (ibid). Balzacq (2005), 
proposes security as pragmatic act which consists of the agent and the act.  The agent 
includes the ‘power position and the personal identity of who does security’, the social 
identity which constrains and enables the actor’s behaviour, and lastly the audience’s 
nature and the opponents that are being dealt with. The second level is that of ‘act’; while 
‘action type’ suggests the ‘appropriate language’ that can be used while performing the 
act, ‘contextual’ is which ‘heuristic artifacts’ does the actor choose to create the situation 
that enables ‘mobilisation of the audience’ (Balzacq, 2005).  
 According to Huysmans, speech act has been displaced by ‘diffuse and associative 
securitising work of what from the perspective of existential speech acts mostly appear 
as little security nothings, such as programming algorithms, routine collections of data 
and looking at CCTV footage’ (Huysmans, 2011). Much of the discussions regarding 
security focused specifically on the linguistics and examining speech and discourse and 
specifically speech acts. What did not receive much attention was the issues activated in 
speech act, exclusion of silence, images and felicity of speech act. This rendered the ‘act’ 
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of speech act mostly untouched. Further, ‘circulation of security speech’ and the apparent 
refusal or appropriation is also deemed important by Huysmans (ibid). For Wæver, the 
rights and responsibilities of an actor are redefined in securitisation. Therefore, he 
presents it as an illocutionary act instead of perlocutionary so that he is able to mould and 
organise the theory around ‘constitutive, transformative event of actors reconfiguring the 
relationship of rights and duties’ instead of a regular cause-effect relationship between 
speech and effects (Wæver, 2015). As seen before, the central point that security speech 
act makes is that it takes an issue out of the mundane routine politics and elevates it. The 
success has been said to be whether the audience accepts the argument of securitisation 
or not but rather when the act consists of rupturing scene, it is about engaging in the 
creation of the scene. When an actor makes a speech act, they are basically making a 
decision whereby they are also responsible towards others and will be held accountable 
for their actions (Huysmans, 2011).  
 According to the constructivist methods of social studies, language is looked upon 
as an order of practise and an order of analysis and the social and political realities are 
constructed through the acts of language that has the performative power (Guillaume, 
2018). An important discussion brought up by Guillaume is that of silence, especially in 
the context of feminism in security studies. There is a lack of literature that points towards 
the efforts that are responsible for silencing women and even trivialisation of the violence 
that are presumed to be outside of the political discussion. While silence indicates an 
exclusion of the silenced groups that need a politically aided voice to speak up, it can also 
indicate that there is a greater risk upon speaking up for the silenced (ibid). Even through 
the securitisation theory has had its share of criticism, what the criticism lacks is a 
feminist perspective on the issue of silencing. As Hansen (2000) rightly points out, 
securitisation is based on the situation wherein speech is possible, the problem is with the 
fact that whether the social actors have the capacity to speak security is understood 
through the security framework. This situation seems like catch 22 one as women face 
difficulty in reporting their insecurities hence also in becoming a referent object of 
security through speech (ibid). The issue with this is that although the absence of a verbal 
speech should not be understood as a total incapability to speak security, what is 
important to understand here is that security should not only rely on verbal speech because 
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it excludes women from participating, thus getting ignored by the securitisation 
framework (Guillaume, 2011).  
 Huysmans points out that the actualisation of decisions of speech act can be 
problematic when it comes to analysis and political critique. This is because speech act 
works through the formula of gravitation and not diffusion, while differentiating between 
the everyday and the exceptional. This dispersing logic is mediated by surveillance 
technologies wherein the people and sites are put into high-risk. The automated process 
carries on without considering any critical decision making (Huysmans, 2011). How 
securitisation develops is important to understand. Through the presence of various 
mediators connecting numerous data, people, and sites, it can also change the materials 
that they are connecting. Therefore, if mediators are numerous then it is much more 
difficult to pin down which actions are actualising a decision thus bringing limits of a 
given order (ibid). Wæver (2015) discusses how securitisation has gone beyond the 
discourse rhetoric to that of ‘political co-production between multiple actors of social 
states’. The theory states that political events can studied empirically as social 
phenomenon.  
 
1.4 Alternative Schools of Thought 
 
One of most prominent schools of security studies apart from Copenhagen school is the 
Critical Security Studies (CSS). Two proponents of the field are Ken Booth and Bill 
McSweeney. Paul Roe in his article, ‘Gender and ‘Positive’ Security’, Accurately 
captures McSweeney and Booth’s contribution to CSS. Both McSweeney and Booth 
share the normative idea of the individual being the ultimate referent object in security 
studies. McSweeney describes security as an object that is provided for someone else and 
security is a relationship is a quality that secures one and another. He is a proponent of 
ontological security that believes everyday routines provide a sense of security among 
individuals as they relate with others. It is when the ‘sameness’ in behaviour and its 
regularity is used to maintain a sense of security in society (Roe, 2013). Even though this 
kind of ontological security can depend on the state’s survival in terms of territory and 
population, these are nevertheless secondary. Critical security study is based on the idea 
of politicisation of security. Therefore, security is viewed as a natural response to a threat 
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and the security studies is more than a simple ‘provider of expert knowledge to tackle 
threats’ (Nunes, 2012).  
 Interesting to note that McSweeney believes it is important to judge the role of 
military in deterrence and resistance and how threat can be prevented. Therefore, both 
McSweeney and Booth consider positive security as a way to ‘promote non-divisive 
relations between communities’ (Roe, 2013). Booth makes it clear that while the 
extraordinary nature of security will provide with necessary prominence to issues which 
will in turn enable mobilisation of resources, it is not convenient to accept the logic of 
war (ibid). This is evident in his article, ‘Ten Flaws of Just Wars’, where he says ‘Just 
Wars are just wars’ implying that normalises the act of violence. This is because how one 
defines a Just War is subjective and so is the idea of self-defence. Similarly, right 
intentions are also questioned because it might not always be the reasons given by the 
actors are the actual causes for the action; legitimate authority can be a political 
preference of the actor and last resort sounds questionable since there might just be other 
measures that have better chances at working out (Booth, 2000). Like how Nunes (2012) 
puts it, there is nothing natural about security. This is because security as a field of study 
is based on construction and reproduction and performance, and the violent meanings 
associated are due to the social and historical process that is subjected to change.  
 Another school of thought is the Paris school. Scholars of the Paris school of 
thought it is not that security solely depends on the art of persuasive language or oratory 
skills, but that technical sophistication can also help create securitisation. This might help 
with the issue of the audience’s acceptance of the securitising act (Balzacq et al. 2015). 
Bigo writes, in the context of migration and its issues, that the major reason why some 
politicians or people are against migration could be traced back to the ideological problem 
of securitisation wherein the language used by actors while making speech acts are 
problematised. Therefore, how an issue is securitised is due to how he actors and their 
speech acts that mobilise the population (Bigo, 2002). According to Bigo, the study of 
sovereignty and security needs to be seen as a genealogical analysis and not just tools of 
social reality. The rise of sovereignty is due to the particular way of governing wherein 
the authority is used to force social practises as required. Similar to the practises of 
security which is considered an outcome of how political actors create threats, authority 
is not self-imposed but established intersubjectively (ibid). 
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 Huysmans (2002), on a similar context of immigration, writes that in order to turn 
immigration into a security issue, there is a requirement of institutions, knowledge of 
security, and expectations of social interactions amongst social groups. He considers it an 
intersubjective understanding of security wherein in the centre is the interaction between 
different actions articulating a security knowledge and mobilising security expectations 
in an already institutionalised context (Huysmans, 2002). There is danger involved as it 
can always contribute to a fascist mobilisation or internal insecurity since it is performed 
in already politicised contexts. Security writings take place in a situation where social 
questions are already contested in terms of crisis and threats. He lays emphases on the 
role of language in the conceptualisation of security and mobilisation. The construction 
of security relies heavily on how the agencies produce the sense of security and 
emergency and how the media reproduces and interprets the danger, plus how the social 
movements accept the emergencies and threat and counters it. Therefore, language plays 
the role of a mediator in this context as it brings together social practices into 
communicative form. This constructivist notion of security moves away from the 
representational understanding of language to a more performative one, thereby 
promoting the idea that ‘by saying it, something is done’. Therefore, a generic 
understanding of language requires the enunciation of security and mobilisation of 
security knowledge, it needs to be performed successfully after which it integrates 
problem definitions, institutional process, and expectations under one roof, and a 
constellation of rules and logic that helps organise security practises (ibid).  
 
1.5 Securitisation of Kashmir  
 
The securitisation theory has been applied on Islam and Muslims previously (Cesari, 
2012; Mavelli, 2013; Ajala, 2014; Koning, 2020) to show how the Muslim minorities 
from Western societies are being securitised. Prominent literatures on Kashmir deals with 
the history of the conflict where the dispute is studied in relation to the India-Pakistan 
feud. While Mukherjee (2016) shows through his article how the conflict took shape over 
these years vis-à-vis India and Pakistan, Ganguly et al. (2018) examines the conflict and 
concludes by stating that a transformation in conflict through either peaceful thawing, 
violent thawing, and/or conflict withering seems unlikely. Further, Kashmir’s 
secessionist aspirations have been of special interest along with numerous proxy wars 
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that took place between India and Pakistan (Ganguly, 2001). Studies on separatism also 
include the rise in militancy in the region that took place in 1990s (Evans, 2000), as well 
as the Indian counterinsurgency that followed afterwards, thus making the secessionist 
voices stronger (Staniland, 2013). Therefore, a bulk of literature on Kashmir focuses on 
its territorial conflict that invariably brings in the conflict between India and Pakistan. In 
order to understand Kashmir’s autonomous status, it is important to first understand the 
Constitutional provision that enables it: Article 370. Sathe (1990) writes on the 
Constitutional obligations of Article 370 wherein he mentions an important fact which 
will be of prime importance later on the thesis: according to the Indian Constitution, no 
government can unilaterally revoke Article 370 without the state (Jammu and Kashmir) 
government’s agreement. The revocation of Article 370 is a relatively recent development 
in the Kashmir crisis. Meaning the literatures that deal with Article 370, discuss its 
implications on Kashmiri politics and the secessionist aims. Lalwani and Gayner (2020) 
trace the event back to its militant roots, and how the 2013-2019 era of ‘quasi-violence 
resistance’ led to the drastic decision. Medha (2019), writes about how the revocation of 
the autonomy was an act of repression as well as ‘legally questionable’ while pointing 
out how the move was politically motivated towards BJP’s goal of ‘Hindu Rashtra’ 
(Hindu nation-state).  
Liberal peace and orthodox terrorism theory is when the government’s 
explanation for the terrorism is encouraged. Therefore, it is made to suit the hegemonic 
and liberal and even authoritarian agendas. In this case the non-state violence is defined 
as terrorism while the state violence is legitimised. Orthodox terrorism emphasises on 
anti-state violence and deems it illegitimate that is aimed at destabilising the authority or 
state. This view is reasonable when seen from the state’s point of view wherein it is useful 
to maintain order and security against terrorism. state terrorism in this theory is 
considered as state sponsored terrorism which carried out illiberal states (Richmond and 
Franks, 2009). Modern liberal peacebuilding focuses more on building states that have 
significant institutions, control of security, and territory. However, their influence in local 
and global markets are limited thereby falling short in providing safety and benefit to 
those who most need it. According to Richmond, one of the mistakes when it comes to 
negotiation is when the local power brokers are ignored or excluded because of their 
controversial nature and ideologies. This is because the very point of these negotiations 
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is to minimise any sort of compromise on human rights and thus provide safety to the 
general human population. If the state fails to do so, it might lead to negative peace 
(Richmond and Tellidis, 2012).  
 Richmond and Franks (2009) further rightly points out the fact that the core 
problem with Kashmir is the proxy war between India and Pakistan. Therefore, most of 
the literature dealing with securitisation concentrates on Indo-Pak relations due to the 
turbulent nature between the two. Also, one of the constant reasons for the rift between 
India and Pakistan continues to be Kashmir itself. Therefore, to securitise and resolve the 
Kashmir crisis it becomes vital to understand the dynamic between the two nuclear power 
states first. Further, it becomes important to dissect the conflict by navigate the Islamic 
terrorism that is flourishing in the valley, which has become an existential threat for India. 
Mostly because the civilians in the valley have termed the local actors perpetrating 
violence as ‘militants’ and not ‘terrorists’ as the Indian government prefers to define 
them. Thus, separating them from ‘Islamic terrorists’ and local Maoist militants 
(Richmond and Franks, 2009). This also puts forward the idea that they are protecting 
their land and fighting ‘for’ and not ‘against’ it as the government puts it. The reason why 
the peace process has been unstable is because of its weak, top down, and elitist nature 
that is way too focused on national prestige, national territories, but most importantly 
because even though the crisis is technically of Kashmir, it is never about Kashmir; the 
attention always goes to India and Pakistan rather than the Kashmiris. An orthodox 
approach to terrorism would further help the two sides more rather than a liberal 
peacebuilding approach due to the underlying irridentist issue. This is problematic 
because it gives the conflict a nationalist turn which only benefits the elites by placing all 
the power in their hands while simultaneously disempowering the locals. Therefore, the 
right thing to do will be go for an approach that is pro-democratic politics and not 
nationalism (Richmond and Tellidis, 2012).  
 The thesis aims to fill the literature gap by applying the theory of securitisation in 
the case of revocation of Article 370 by analysing speeches made by BJP leaders on 
Muslims, terrorism, and Kashmir using discourse analysis. Previous literatures have 
studied Modi’s speeches in the context of Islamophobia through language-games 
(Waikar, 2018). The securitisation theory has been applied in the context of the 2016 
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surgical strikes that took place between India and Pakistan and the implications it has for 
Kashmir (Kapur, 2017).  
 
1.6. Thesis Expectations 
 
The thesis, upon the application of securitisation theory on the case of abrogation of 
Kashmir’s autonomy (Article 370), expects to unfold the underlying motives of the BJP 
government. The thesis expects to find out that the main reason behind the revocation of 
the autonomous status was the BJP government’s right-wing nationalism and to make 
demographic changes in the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir. It expects to refute the 
government’s claim that the revocation was due to the increasing terrorist activities in the 
territory. Further, it expects to show to link between the BJP’s divisive policies towards 
Muslims in India and its highly militaristic style of governance, and how it was fused 
together to create a state of exception in Kashmir, and thus securitising it.  
 
2.  Research Design and Method  
 
The thesis seeks to answer two research questions that are related. The first one seeks to 
answer the reason behind the revocation of the Kashmir autonomy; and the second 
addresses how speech acts have enabled securitization of anti-Hindu elements in Indian 
society and justified the measures taken in the case of “state of exception”. The thesis 
would therefore seek to address whether there was any other underlying motive behind 
the revocation other than curbing terrorism, i.e., anti-Muslim motives. Plus, it will also 
answer how securitization process has been carried out on different levels. In order to 
answer these questions, the thesis adopts a case study of Kashmir, India. The thesis will 
look into videos and texts of prominent political leaders from Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) 
to analyze the underlying anti-Muslim sentiments. Along with this, party manifestos and 
electoral programme highlighting the parties aims to promote traditional Hindu values 
against Muslim influences will be analyzed. Sources from social media accounts of the 
politicians will also be collected that points towards the idea that territorial threat to India 




2.1 Case Selection – Kashmir  
 
The case of Kashmir was selected for the reason that the government of India has heavily 
securitized the region due to an overwhelming amount of terrorist activities. Even though 
Indian government insists that Kashmir is an internal matter, there is no denying that 
foreign actors are involved, thus internationalizing the issue. Pakistan sponsoring 
terrorists across the border in order to lay claims on Kashmir and India fighting proxy 
wars from Kashmir border to attack Pakistani terror groups points to the fact that there is 
more than what meets the eye. The period in focus is the Narendra Modi era, i.e., 2014 to 
present. For the longest time, from 1947 when India received independence till 2014, the 
Indian Congress had a stronghold in Indian politics. Even though Kashmir has always 
been a bone of contention between India and Pakistan and has influenced India’s domestic 
and foreign politics, Congress dealt Kashmir with a comparatively light hand compared 
to BJP, implying that the Congress have engaged in bilateral dialogues with Pakistan, 
although ultimately unsuccessful, regarding Kashmir. The second phase, where BJP takes 
control, matters take turn for the worse when they announce in their manifesto that one 
of the first step they will take if elected to power, is to revoke Article 370, thus integrating 
Kashmir into India.  
However, the paper will only focus on BJP and their decision regarding Kashmir 
and Islamic terrorism because the revocation is a drastic measure and needs to be 
understood not just separately but together with how the BJP has managed to securitize 
it while simultaneously Othering the Muslim populations of India. One of the reasons 
why the thesis looks into other factors that could have led to the revocation is because the 
official statement provided by the government does not sound convincing. According to 
the Modi government, the decision to revoke the autonomy was a long-awaited decision 
to curb cross-border terrorism. If we compare the data from 2000 (Congress era), we see 
a total of 1708 terrorist/insurgent related incidents, which is significantly higher than the 
data from 2019 (year of revocation), which is only 163 (SATP). Thus, pointing to an 





2.2. Method – Discourse Analysis  
 
In order to analyze the case, discourse analysis method is implemented. It analyses the 
speeches of prominent political actors from BJP. Emphasis is placed on how the identity 
of Kashmiris as well as Muslims are constructed and presented through public speeches 
and interviews. These materials are then analysed to understand how the speeches have 
created a certain narrative around Muslims and Kashmiris, presenting them as the “threat” 
that destroying the nationalism. How language is structured can bring forward the 
importance of political agencies the identity that it constructs. Identity is said to be created 
through the enactment of discursive foreign policy, however, the identity that is created 
can be understood as the ‘legitimisation for the policy proposed’ (Hansen, 2006). This is 
precisely why discourse analysis fits the case of Kashmir wherein the government tries 
to construct an identity to push forward its policies and narratives. Moreover, the reason 
why discourse analysis is preferred over other methods is because in order to understand 
the political and policy implications that speeches of BJP leaders have, it is important to 
understand how identity itself is constructed and how that created identity is used to 
securitise Kashmir:  
 
“The construction of identity should therefore be situated inside a careful investigation of which 
signs are articulated by a particular discourse or text, how they are coupled to achieve discursive 
stability, where instabilities and slips between these constructions might occur, and how 
competing discourses construct the same sign to different effects” (Hansen, 2006: 37) 
 
The way the thesis is structured, it looks at the discourse that is set by the BJP through its 
heavy military stance, whereby PM Modi is seen applauding the Indian army for defeating 
terrorist activities while also focusing on how international organisations need to start 
taking actions against terrorist organisations, while constantly othering the Muslim 
minorities of India, by presenting them as savages whose identities do not align with the 
dominant Hindus. This is then used to understand how the securitisation of Kashmir takes 
place and how the action is justified. As Hansen (2006) points out, the idea of discourse 
is that it ‘provides a lens through which a multitude of different representations and 
policies can be seen as systematically connected’.  
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2.3. Source Selection- Speech Acts  
 
The materials analysed are the official statements made by key leaders from BJP. The 
sources include public speeches, interviews, and social media interactions of government 
officials, and ministers. Materials that lack attribution to a particular author, i.e., 
manifesto and electoral programmes are also analysed. The materials include speeches 
made by state-level ministers because of the specific kind of language used by them which 
provokes nationalist reactions from the crowd. The video materials analysed for the thesis 
includes mostly interviews and speeches made in Hindi, since most of the ministers are 
more fluent in Hindi than English and their audiences also tend to be mostly from the 
Hindi belt region of India, which gets their message across and is thus easier to mobilise. 
However, interviews made on international forums are also used, although the number is 
significantly less as the spokespersons either divert the controversial questions or answer 
extremely diplomatically. Texts and speeches were selected on the basis of the speaker 
using “securitising” words and raising concerns on the growing Muslim populations that 
threatened the majority Hindu population.  
 The thesis excludes any materials from opposition parties or regional parties of 
Kashmir. This is to keep the focus clear and avoid diversion from the actual research 
question. Also, majority of the video and text materials are taken from 2014 onwards 
unless necessary for the progression of the thesis and understanding. Materials like news 
analysis, journalist opinions, and third-person blogs are avoided unless the ministers and 





One of the limitations of the thesis is the minimal number of speeches from the Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi that securitises Kashmir and Others the Muslims. Because Modi 
maintains an extremely diplomatic public image, it was difficult to procure materials 
where he uses provocative terms to describe Muslims or Kashmiris. This is why the 
materials are mostly collected from his right-hand Amit Shah who is also the Home 
Minister and other second tier ministers (chief ministers, and MLAs). Along with this, 
there is no opinion pieces available from the Prime Minister, Home Minister, or Foreign 
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Minister’s desk, in English or Hindi. One of the reasons why this might be the case could 
be the fact that majority of the BJP voters prefer watching the prime-time news debate 
more than they prefer reading the newspaper or news apps. Another important limitation 
faced during source selection is having to eliminate any news journalist commentary from 
mainstream news channels (both Hindi and English). This was done to narrow down the 
research further, focusing only on political actors from the BJP. All the materials analysed 
are public speeches (except the BJP manifesto from 2014 and 2019).  
 
3. Analysis  
 
This part of the thesis will look into the Indian government’s stance regarding Muslims 
as well as Kashmiris. It is divided into three sections, the first section, using discourse 
analysis, breaks down speeches made by BJP members as well as interviews where they 
make specific remarks about Muslims posing a threat to the unity and security of India. 
The purpose of this is to explain the ongoing communal violence and how it spills over 
to the crisis in Kashmir. The second part focuses on public speeches made by PM 
Narendra Modi on terrorism, thereby showing how the stage is being set for the next 
securitising move (Kashmir). The third part focuses on the Kashmir issue and how the 
speeches made by these BJP members so far have led to the securitisation of the state 
which in turn led to the revocation of the autonomy.  
 
3.1. Securitising Muslims in India: The Case of Endangered Hindus 
 
The BJP’s roots as a Hindu nationalist party can be traced all the way to Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) (lit. meaning national self-service organisation). Founded in 
1925 by K.B. Hedgewar, he believed in a united Hindu society that is strong enough to 
fight the Muslim and Christian conquests that has happened for centuries (for example: 
Mughal rule and British rule). Further, the second RSS chief, M. Golwalkar admired 
Hitler for his determination to keep Germany ‘pure’, while Vinayak Savarkar, a major 
ideologue of the organisation, believed that while Muslims and Christians can reside in 
the Hindu state of India, they should nevertheless adopt ‘Hindu cultures and traditions as 
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national norms’ (Swaminathan and Aiyar, 2020). This should provide a baseline for the 
ideologies that inspires BJP and the kind of narratives it sets and sells.  
 
Wenden (2005:93) describes an ideology as a set of fundamental and normative 
ideas regarding the social realities that are perceived and shared by members of groups, 
society, or culture. And more often than not, these set of ideologies are used to justify 
and/or frame actions and opinions and thereby control, directly/indirectly, how people 
understand their social surroundings and practices, which also includes the use of 
language. Furthermore, because ideologies persist over time, their existence is rarely 
questioned. Below is an example of the predominate ideology amongst some Hindu 
groups regarding Muslims and how it plays out in politics.  
 
Muslims should not live in this country. They have divided the country on the basis of population, 
then what is the need to live in this country? They got their own land; they should go to Bangladesh 
or Pakistan. What business do they have here?3 – (Katiyar, 2020). 
 
This is a perfect example of Othering wherein the Muslims are seen as a foreign element 
in the society that is not just the cause of unrest, but even their mere existence in the state 
is deemed problematic. It is also important to point out early on in the thesis, the notion 
that India, or Hindusthan, is a land that traditionally belonged to the Hindus. Thereby 
naturally it is perceived as a territory that upholds the Hindu way of life and anyone who 
lives within the boundaries of it must observe the rules and values. The India 
independence of 1947 led to the Partition of India and the creation of the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan. Because of the constant political tension between India and Pakistan, and the 
fact that it is an Islamic country, Muslims from India are often perceived to be more loyal 
to Pakistan than to India. Hence, the comment from Katiyar reflects this very idea that 
the Muslims have their own Islamic countries across the border (Bangladesh and 
Pakistan) and are free to go there. As mentioned by Guzzini (2011) earlier in the thesis, 
securitising actor perceives security the way they deem it fit. Therefore, while 
securitisation can be objective, it is also subjective because the actor makes a conscious 
 
3“Musalman toh yeh desh ke andar rehna nahi chahiye. Unhone jansankhya ke aadhar par desh ka 
batwara kar liya, toh phir yahan iss desh ke andar kya aavashyakta thi? Unko alag bhuvag de diya gaya; 
Bangladesh ya Pakistan jayein, yahan kya kaam hai unko?”- 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=svSibIf8k4s 
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political choice. In this case, the actor Vinay Katiyar, securitises Muslims the way he 
thinks they are affecting the overall political scenario of India. By doing so, he is taking 
out the normal state of politics and turning it into a state of emergency. This securitising 
behaviour can be further understood by looking at another speech made by a BJP member.  
 
You Muslims are traitors to the country. You sit inside mosques and issue fatwas (religious 
decrees). You don’t pray but collect weapons inside the mosque. Is this why you need mosques? 
If you Muslims persist on the same path, I will transfer the funds meant for you to the Hindus in 
my district. Let our people (Hindus) prosper. I will keep you (Muslims) where you deserve to be 
kept. This will be my kind of politics4- (Renukacharya 2020). 
 
Like the previous quote, this one too is a strong case of Othering which can be instantly 
noticed by the constant use of the word ‘you’. Further the word ‘traitors’ points back to 
the idea of how Muslims are disloyal to India since their loyalties always lie with Pakistan 
(Muslim country). The mosque is also shown to be a place where violent crimes take 
place or as a source of criminal activities, ‘collect weapons inside mosques.’ Therefore, 
the mosques, in the eyes of BJP, no longer represents a place of worship but is rather 
shown as a threatening source of crime. ‘If you Muslims persist on the same path’ points 
to idea that Muslims are involved with violent crimes, assuming that they are threatening 
to the nation. ‘I will keep you in where you deserve to be kept’, is a clear reference to the 
fact that Muslims and Hindus do not deserve to coexist, that they are a foreign element 
that tarnishes the sanctity of the Hindu values that BJP upholds.  
A similar, and in fact a much more serious threat, is uttered by another BJP minister which 
further proves the point that the Muslims are seen as oppressed and are not considered as 
an equal counterpart to the Hindus.  
 
The BJP is in Power, the difficulties you didn’t suffer earlier, you may face now. I want to ask 
Muslims, vote for us, I am not asking for alms. If you don’t vote you will face consequences5- 
(Srivastava, 2017).  
 
Here the word ‘consequences’ is important as the minister suggests that if the Muslims 
do not vote for the party, their existence in the state will be risky. This means that the 
 
4 “Muslims store weapons in mosques – India’s ruling BJP lawmaker”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dsHXCRMyTyI 
5 “Bharatiya Janata Party ka shasan hai. Jo kasht tumko nahi jhelne pare, who kasht tumko uthane 
parengey. Isiliye main Mussalmano se keh raha hoon, vote de dena, bheekh nahi maang raha hoon. Agar 
vote dogey toh sukhi rahogey”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dsHXCRMyTyI 
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Muslims have to comply to the ruling party which is in ‘power’ since they are the ones 
who are controlling the status quo. The BJP member does not mention Hindus who will 
face consequences if they do not vote, this can mean that it is already assumed that the 
Hindu vote bank is achieved because they will automatically side with a Hindu-nationalist 
government, whereas the Muslims might want to vote out the ruling party by voting for 
other parties. On top of this, the word ‘alms’ also denotes that this is not a regular election 
campaign wherein the minister asks for votes in exchange of promises of services, rather 
it is more of a green card for the Muslims, who will be ‘allowed’ to live peacefully is they 
vote for the party. The MP wants the Muslim community to know that it is a warning for 
them to which they have to comply.  
  
 
…. Hindus have never created any conflicts in this country… Why not follow America like how 
they killed Osama Bin Laden and tossed him in the ocean? If they don’t have any identity or 
religion then why not behave like this with them?... Hindu cannot be terrorist, and if they are then 
they need to tried as per Indian laws6 – (Yogi Adityanath, 2014) 
 ( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tz8AnxOTy3U ) 
 
The above statement was made by present Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, India in 2014, 
three years before he assumed office in the state under BJP. As a yogi (saint) one would 
expect him to be soft-spoken and accepting towards all communities, however, his anti-
Muslim stance is not new to anyone in India. In 2019, during the national elections, he 
was banned from campaigning for three days by the election commission due to his 
rampant anti-Muslim comments. He was warned regarding his speeches wherein he 
referred to Muslim voters as “green virus” (Reuters, 2019). This speech from 2014, where 
his divisive policies are clearly visible, he makes claims that Hindus can never be 
terrorists. This view is upheld by Modi himself wherein he believes if one were to be a 
terrorist, he cannot be a Hindu. This claim was made after Nathuram Godse, Mahatma 
Gandhi’s assassinator, was called India’s first terrorist by a politician (Scroll, 2019). In 
this speech, not only does Yogi Adityanath claim that Muslims are the ones who spread 
terrorism, he also states that they should not be spared at all and deserve to be killed off 
 
6 “Iss desh ke andar ek bhi danga Hindu’on ki or se nahi hua… kyun nahi unko America ke jaise, Osama 
Bin Laden ko America ne samudra mein dal diya pata hi nahi laga kahan chala gaya. Waise hi kyun nahi 
unke saath vyavhaar karte phir? Hindu pehle aatankvadi nahi ho sakta, aur agar hai, galat hai, bharat ke 
kanoon ke anusaar jo karyavahi ho sakti hai aap woh karyavaahi kariye”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tz8AnxOTy3U 
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instantly the way USA dealt with Osama Bin Laden. Compare this with the last line, 
where he says if ever a Hindu was to be a terrorist in India, they must be tried according 
to the laws of the land. This clearly points to the idea that he does not consider Muslims 
to be legal citizens of India, and they do not deserve to be tried in Indian courts under 
Indian judiciary, rather should be ‘tossed in the ocean’ like Bin Laden. His unyielding 
faith in Hindus being so loyal to India that they cannot be terrorist further places emphasis 
that BJP considers Hindus to be the indigenous people of the land. However, there is still 
doubt over who BJP considers a patriot. While being known internationally as ‘father of 
the nation, Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated by Nathuram Godse, who interestingly was 
from RSS or Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (closely related to BJP). However, Gandhi’s name 
and reputation are being tarnished in his own country by BJP leaders who instead claim 
Godse was a patriot and not Gandhi (The Hindu, 2021). So, here we have both a Hindu 
who was also independent India’s first terrorist, but BJP conveniently places him on a 
pedestal for killing the father of the nation.  
  
This ideology of the BJP that Hindus cannot be terrorists can be understood better 
through the following texts.  
 
… Hindutva by its nature cannot be aggressive, because the very response of Hindutva emanated 
to be defensive. … we must discuss today is why did the Hindus of this land had to come up with 
an intellectual and political response like Hindutva. Because unless we examine and scrutinise the 
very basis of Abrahamic Semitic faith, which by their very nature are proselytising, which by their 
nature are predatory, which not just that, by their own nature even go to the extent of negating 
existence of other faiths as false faiths then we must ask questions as to should the Hindu not come 
up with a response, intellectual, political, or otherwise, to preserve and perpetuate. As long as 
proselytising religions will continue their existence as proselytising religions, Hindutva should be 
there to protect itself and not just protect itself but also protect the values that Hindu society has 
perpetually held as sacred and sacrosanct. Those values are in consonant to the modern secular 
values that the Indian constitution so dearly upholds7. – (Tejasvi Surya, 2020) 
 
 
This text is an excellent example of Othering by placing blame on an entire religion while 
simultaneously guarding the other. Tejasvi Surya, a 30-year-old MP from Bangalore, 
India, claims that Hindus ‘of this land’ had to come up with an ‘intellectual and political 
response like Hindutva’. Two things are important here; one- Hindus of this land, refers 
 
7 “BJP MP Tejasvi Surya’s take on need of Hindutva in 21st century”,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhw__4zo3Do 
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to the idea that Hindus have always been the indigenous people of India, thereby they are 
the original occupant. Two, the fact that Hindutva is seen as an ‘intellectual and political 
response’ points to the fact that it was guarding India against a potential ‘threat’- a state 
of emergency or security threat. What is the potential threat that Hindutva has to combat? 
He answers it in the next sentence. The Abrahamic Semitic faiths- Islam and Christianity. 
The second half of the speech is extremely important. The speaker terms these Abrahamic 
Semitic faiths as ‘predatory’, ‘proselytising’, and ‘negating existence of other faiths as 
false faiths.’ By using the word ‘predatory’ to describe Islam and Christianity, he paints 
an animalistic/beastly picture of the religion wherein it would come across as savage and 
uncivilised to the audience. This, again, is in sharp contrast to the ‘intellectual’ Hindutva 
which is shown to be civilised and cultured and calm natured. Islam and Christianity are 
termed ‘proselytising’, converting people from one religion to another, because it is 
feared that on the basis of population, Muslims will outnumber Hindus in their own land, 
thus rendering them a minority (India Today, 2020). Lastly, negating existence of other 
faiths as false arises from the idea that both Islam and Christianity are monotheistic, as 
opposed to a polytheistic Hinduism. However, given that India indeed is a secular country 
where Muslims, Hindus, and Christians have peacefully co-existed up until now, it is 
doubtful that this will be a central reason for conflict. His stress on Hindutva being a 
‘response’ to ‘preserve and perpetuate’ hints at the fact that the idea inches towards 
security. He brings forward a political issue (Hindu-Muslim conflict) and raises it to a 
security threat level by claiming that Hindutva has to ‘protect’ India from these other 
religions. Words like ‘response’ and ‘protect’ gives the audience a feeling of emergency 
where they feel like they have to take action against the threat.  
 
The sense of Othering in the next speech is telling. India was ruled by the Mughals for 
over 200 years, and while they left behind a rich heritage, they also boosted India’s GDP 
significantly even when the British took over. However, lately the BJP is busy maligning 
this legacy of the Mughal Raj (empire) by either reclaiming Mughal architecture as a 
Hindu temple, or projecting the Indian Muslim as someone who is carrying on the legacy 
of the Raj. The reason why experts have been quick to notice this trend amongst the BJP 
members is because the same hatred is not forwarded towards the British Rule, who have 
also governed India for 200 years (National Herald, 2017). Therefore, this is not just an 
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aversion towards foreign rule, and interestingly what yet again stands out as the common 
factor between these two reigns is that the Mughal Rulers were in fact Muslims.  
 
 
… What is happening today in Shaheen Bagh (Delhi) is a stark reminder that if the majority of the 
country is not vigilant, if the patriotic Indians do not stand up to this the days of Mughal Raj 
coming back and revisiting Delhi are not very far. What is happening in Shaheen Bagh is fanatic 
Islamism, masquerading in the garb of constitutional secularism and therefore we must exercise 




Here, Surya remarks on the ongoing protest of Muslim citizens against the government 
bill that will potentially render millions stateless (PRS, 2019). He compares a peaceful 
protest by Muslim women at Shaheen Bagh, Delhi to the Mughal Raj (Aljazeera, 2020). 
He uses the word ‘vigilant’ directing the audience to be on their guard and on the lookout 
for any activity that might be a potential threat to the country and also engages in security 
talk. Also, saying that ‘days of the Mughal Raj coming back and revisiting Delhi are not 
very far’ creates a sense of emergency; the audience is being reminded of a previous 
foreign rule that took over India even before the British, and the fact that it is forthcoming. 
What is interesting to note about speeches made by Surya is that he knows how to capture 
the audience’s attention by using keywords that are headline worthy. This is reflected in 
how he says that the protest in Shaheen Bagh is ‘fanatic Islamism masquerading in the 
garb of constitutional secularism’. This peaceful sit-in protest by Indian-Muslim women 
being labelled as fanatic Islamism is prime security talk. He takes a harmless situation 
and presents it as a threat (or a threat that is highly unlikely to actually take effect; read: 
a second Mughal Rule). Also, he not only divides the communities but also divides 
secularism, ‘masquerading in the garb of constitutional secularism’ and ‘true secularism’. 
This could refer to the idea that the demands made by Muslims are actually fanatic 
Islamism that is not constitutional in nature (thus unlawful) and that Indians should take 
precaution to make sure the ‘right’ of secularism is upheld.  
Continuing on the same idea of Hindutva being the defender, Surya, yet again makes 




8 “’Mughal Raj not far away’: BJP MP Tejasvi Surya on Shaheen Bagh protest”,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1FJXu_4rf1Y 
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… The primary philosophical thought of India was all inclusive, all accepting. It was never 
exclusivist and most importantly it never negated the exitance and validity of any other 
philosophical and spiritual and religious thought. However, when this land, came into contact with 
Semitic and Abrahamic faiths like Christianity and Islam, which inherently are exclusivist, which 
inherently are conflicting, predatory and proselytising, there needed to be a response by a non-
exclusive inclusive faith which can be called the commonwealth of Hindu spiritual traditions, to 
therefore respond to the aggression, predation, and proselytising attempts by the Abrahamic faith 
that came to Indian soil, a response was made by Indians by Hindus of that time, and that in the 
late context was called Hindutva… In that sense, Hindutva is an intellectual political, social 
response of the Hindus to prevent itself and themselves against aggression. Therefore, Hindutva 





It is understood in the first sentence that by ‘primary philosophical thought’ he means 
Hinduism, and he says that it is inclusive and all accepting. He then places the blame on 
Christianity and Islam, or as he likes to mention, ‘Abrahamic Semitic faiths.’ It is striking 
to note how he phrases Hinduism as a ‘primary philosophical thought’ and Christianity 
and Islam as not just an exclusivist faith, but also as something that India ‘came in contact 
with’, a phrase typically used in relation with disease or harmful substances. He also terms 
Christianity and Islam as ‘inherently conflicting and predatory and proselytising’, this 
means he is not separating the faith from the believers. According to him, the religion 
preaches monotheism and the followers practise it therefore, they are too inherently 
conflicting and predatory and proselytising. In the later portion of the speech, he says that 
Hinduism is the potential inclusivity of commonwealth of indigenous thought whereby it 
is the defender of that which is against inclusivity. However, by terming ‘Abrahamic 
Semitic faiths’ as ‘predatory and proselytising’ he is already presenting an exclusivist 
ideology. By stating that Hindutva is an ‘intellectual political, social response of the 
Hindus’ to prevent themselves from aggression, he is already creating a boundary; on the 
inside is the Hindu bubble which is threatened by those outside the border.  
 
 
3.2. Modi’s Speeches on Terrorism 
 
Under Modi, BJP’s political ideology revolves focuses majorly on Hindu nationalism, 
and the way to promote Hindutva policy is by creating an enemy that needs to tamed. In 
 
9 “BJP MP Tejasvi Surya explains meaning of ‘Hindutva’”,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iGCYQlhbuDQ 
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this case it is Pakistan, a country that already happens to have sour relations with India, 
but this time around their links with terrorism is used as a major tool in Modi’s political 
motives. Another reason why Modi constantly berates Pakistan regarding the terrorist 
organisations operating from the country is because of the latter’s irridentist claims on 
Kashmir. Cease-fires with Pakistan is not new, however, BJP’s obsession with the 
revocation of the Article 370 is age-old and was even part of their 2014 and 2019 election 
manifesto. According to BJP the reason why the Article was upheld for so long is due to 
‘minorityism’ which has till now prevented Kashmir from becoming an integral part of 
India (Swaminathan and Aiyar, 2020).  
  
 While the BJP has always insisted on the revocation of the autonomous status, 
there is a definite increase in the sense of urgency towards securitisation of Kashmir. Both 
2014 and 2019 manifestos mention the need to integrate the nation- thus mentioning the 
fact that Kashmir is an integral part of India. However, what is interesting to note here is 
that while in the 2014 manifesto (BJP Election Manifesto, 2014), the issue of Kashmir is 
mentioned on the third page while internal (borders, military) and external security (cross-
border terrorism) seems to have taken a back seat (or so it seems) and is mentioned 
towards the very end. Compare it with the 2019 manifesto (Sankalp Patra, Lok Sabha 
2019), security and terrorism has taken precedence. The very first topic that BJP deals 
with is ‘Nation First’, under ‘zero tolerance towards terrorism’ it is clearly mentioned that 
national security will be first priority and the security forces will be given a free hand in 
combatting terrorism. Further, it pledges to strengthen the Armed Forces by spending 
more on defence equipment and weapons. Finally, the 14th point addresses Article 370 
and its revocation. Previously the issue of Kashmir and national security was seen as 
separate issues. In the 2019 manifesto national security jumped several pages and became 
the number one priority for the BJP indicating that the party now received enough support 
from its audience that legitimises its decision to engage in aggressive warfare with 
Pakistan in its quest for ‘internal and external security’; plus, adding Kashmir in the same 
sub topic points to the fact that Kashmir indeed is a security concern that needs to be dealt 
with. It might also be useful to mention the quote below the page being referred to; Modi 
is quoted as saying: “India supports peace, but the country will not hesitate to take any 
steps required for national security”. The strategic placement of this quote can be 
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interpretated as a reminder to the readers that the BJP’s priority lies in defence and 
security, and military. This can be established by analysing some of the speeches that 
Modi has made through these years, both internationally and in India, where he has 
amplified on the need to eliminate terrorism and increase security and why that is 
important for India. Therefore, our main takeaway from the BJP manifesto is the fact that 
they are military focused while reiterating the need to revoke Article 370. They have 
managed to bring it in the mainstream by combining both security and Kashmir in the 
same frame. Thus, painting Kashmir as a security threat. Through the following speeches 
made by Modi on different occasions, it is noted that terrorism is a topic often repeated 
and emphasised by him.  
…right now, the country’s aspiration is to do something which is very obvious. Our security forces 
have been given complete independence, we have full faith on our army’s courage and bravery. I 
have absolute faith in our patriotic people who will deliver accurate facts to the correct agencies 
so that our fight to trample terrorism can become stronger. I would like to warn the terrorist 
organisations and their head of commands that they have made a huge mistake. And they will have 
to pay a heavy price for this. I promise the country that the perpetrators of the attack will receive 
the appropriate punishment for their crime10. – (Modi, 2019) 
 
The backdrop for this speech is the Pulwama attack which took place on 14th February 
2019 when Jaish-e-Mohammed’s Adil Ahmed Dar (suicide bomber) killed 40 CRPF 
(Central Police Reserve Force) by ramming his vehicle into their bus (The Hindu, 2019). 
It is interesting to note how he says ‘country’s aspiration is to do something which is very 
obvious’, pointing to the basic argument of securitisation theory wherein the actor looks 
for legitimisation from its audience. He conveniently puts the audience in the centre stage 
making it look like it is the audience that actually wants the revenge on the terrorists. 
When just a week later the BJP government ‘carried out non-military, pre-emptive air 
strikes’ in Pakistan to hit the terror camp Jaish-e-Mohammed (NDTV, 2019). Further 
 
10 “Iss samay jo desh ki apekshaye hai, kuch kar guzarne ki bhavnaye hai, who bhi swabhavik hai. 
Hamare suraksha balo’n ko purna swatantrata de di gayi hai. Hamein apne sainiko’n ke shaurya par, unki 
bahaduri par, pura bharosa hai. Mujhe pura bharosa hai, ki desh bhakt ke rang mein range log sahi 
jaankarian bhi hamari agency’o tak pahuchaengey taki aatank ko kuchalne mein hamari larai aur tez ho 
sake. Main aatanki sangathano ko aur unki sarparastho ko kehna chahta hoon ke veh bohot bari galti kar 
chuke hai. Bohot bari keemat unko chukani paregi. Main desh ko bharosa deta hoon ki hamle ke peeche 




stress on the army reveals the party’s militaristic ambitions. Modi is known for his 
oratorial skills and it is clearly evident in this speech where he promotes the nation’s goals 
to avenge the attack through the hands of the army. Again, the line ‘faith in our patriotic 
people’ suggests the divide between those who agree with BJP’s ideology and those who 
don’t. As mentioned before, this not a differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ rather 
‘good’ and ‘evil’. In this sentence the ‘patriots’ are thus the ‘good’ while the terrorists 
and anyone else who do not agree with the BJP ideology ‘evil’. The last two lines makes 
securitisation obvious when he openly threatens the terror groups and their heads that 
they will receive a heavy price for the action. And as we already saw, the BJP did not shy 
away from fulfilling this threat by launching an air strike against the terror groups the 
very next week. This speech can be said to be an appropriate example of how speech acts 
enable securitisation of a political issue.  
 
… our jawaans (army) were killed when they were sleeping in the tents by some cowards, would 
anyone of you want me to remain silent? Should we not retaliate? And this is why we did the 
surgical strike and I am proud of my army…. I told my officers to call up Pakistani army and 
inform them of the strike, before India knows and before the media knows, that we have done this 
tonight, the dead bodies will be there if you have time then go collect them11. – (Modi, 2018) 
 
 
The above speech was made in 2018 and the similarity between the two speeches are 
uncanny (2019 and 2018). The referent object, the audience, the emphasis, the ‘good and 
evil’ are all the same. This makes it evident that the Modi government has a clear referent 
object and audience and an even clearer idea of ally and enemy. The strike was a response 
to Pakistan as insurgents attacked the Indian army base and killed 18 soldiers (BBC, 
2016) Again, the sentence ‘would anyone of you want me to remain silent?’ is more 
rhetoric and persuades the audience into thinking that it would be rather wrong to not 
respond to an attack militarily. This is a classic Modi style wherein he tries to elicit a 
positive response from the audience while simultaneously applauding the army for their 
bravery. By doing this he brings together nationalism and military, making them the two 
 
11 “Hamare jawan’o ko tent mein sowey huye, koi buzdil aa kar unko maut ke ghat utar de. Aap mein se 
koi chahega main chup rahoon? Kya unko eenth ka jawaab patthar se dena chahiye ke nahi dena 
chahiye? Aur isiliye surgical strike kiya, aur mujhe meri sena pe garv hai…. Maine hamare officer’o ko 
kaha, Hindustan ko pata chale usse pehle, media waha pahunche usse pehle, Pakistan ki fauj ko phone 
karke bata do, ki aaj raat humne yeh kiya hai, laashein wahan pari hongi, samay ho jaa karke le aao”.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9B8UO4r4aS8 
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sides of the same coin. Because Modi relies heavily on the Indian army when it comes to 
fighting terrorism, maintaining status quo in Kashmir, or even dealing with Pakistan on a 
daily basis, he needs a constant approval from his audience. It is important for Modi to 
convince his audience that there is a constant looming threat within India (terrorism in 
Kashmir) as well as outside (Pakistan) and in order to counter it, India needs to amplify 
its military. And because the military is advancing the nations priorities, to side with the 





… Some people have problem with the way India handles it (terrorism) when they can’t even 
manage their own country. These people have made hatred towards India their central political 
ideology. These people want conflict, are proponents of terror, and breed terror. Their identities 
are known by the whole world. Be it 9/11 in America or 26/11 in Mumbai, where do you find the 
conspirer of these? Now is the time to combat terrorism and those who encourage terrorism12. – 
(Modi, 2019) 
 
In this speech taken from his Howdy Modi campaign in Houston, USA, he found his 
perfect audience. This is because the NRI (Non-Resident Indian) in the United States 
generously donate to the BJP and is crucial to the party during election campaigns. The 
Howdy Modi event turned out to be a huge success where 50,000 people (mostly Indian-
Americans) attended. His constant reference to “these people”, “some people” hints at 
Pakistan which is presented as the propagator of terrorism. He blames “these people” or 
Pakistan for spreading hatred towards India by making it their political ideology, when 
his 2019 election campaigns relied on bashing Pakistan constantly while pulling out the 
“surgical strike” “air strike” cards to win accolades. Even mentioning it on an 
international platform points to the fact that Pakistan is not just an aggressor or an enemy 
state, but rather an essential ingredient in securitising Kashmir. By placing both Pakistan 
and terrorism in the same sentence not only does he hint that that Pakistan is a security 
 
12 “Bharat apne yahaan jo kar raha hai usse kuch aise logon ko bhi dikkat ho rahi hai, jinse khud apna 
desh sambhal nahi raha hai. In logo’n ne Bharat ke prati nafrat ko apni rajneeti ka kendra bana liya hai. 
Yeh who log hai jo ashanti chahte hain, aatank ke samarthak hai, aatank ko paalte poste hain. Unki 
pehchaan sirf aap nahi puri duniya achi tarah jaanti hai. America mein 9/11 ho ya Mumbai mein 26/11 
ho, uske saazish karta kahan paye jaate hai? Saathiyon ab samay aa gaya hai ki aatankvaad ke khilaaf aur 
aatankvaad ko barhava dene walon ke khilaaf nirnayak larai lari jaye”.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=giQaUwCudG0 
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threat, but rather that Kashmir too is a security threat because it is infiltrated by terrorists 
from across the border. This is his way of turning the secessionist movement into a 
security issue so that his actions (revocation of the autonomy) are justified. Further, by 
saying ‘be it 9/11 in America or 26/11 in Mumbai, where do you find the conspirer of 
these?’ he wants to connect with both American and Indian audience, while reminding 
the US that India shares a common enemy- Pakistan. Through this, he makes it a global 
issue which has to be heeded.  
 
… we are celebrating the UN’s 70 years and still the UN has not defined ‘terrorism’. If it takes so 
long to define terrorism then how long will it take to combat it? … it is because of this lack of 
definition that there is a debate between ‘good terrorism’ and ‘bad terrorism’. Terrorism is 
terrorism. My country is worried about terrorism since past 40 years, we are explaining to the 
world and the world is posing questions to us. This is because a few months before there was a 




In the above speech it is clear that Modi is upset with the UN and demands that it officially 
defines what accounts as terrorism. By now it is evident that one of the most important 
objectives for Modi has always been terrorism. This speech reflects his frustration at the 
international organisations that have been rather ‘unresponsive’ in his opinion. Modi’s 
political style has always been more proactive and he has time and again mentioned how 
the fight against terrorism has to be stringent. What is interesting to note here is how he 
brings up the logic of ‘good terrorism and bad terrorism’. This was idea was previously 
criticised by Hillary Clinton when she warned Pakistan that terrorism is always self-
defeating and dangerous and that the terrorists who target ‘innocent civilians of any 
nationality should not be tolerated or protected’ (BBC, 2011). By doing this, he reminds 
the US that the enemy is known and has previously done large scale damage in the world 
and not just India and therefore action must be taken as soon as possible. He focuses on 
similarities between US and India by recognising the perpetrator who happens to be the 
 
13 “UN ki sattarvi varshghat manayi jaa rahi hai, lekin abhi tak United Nation terrorism ki definition nahi 
kar paya hai. Agar definition karne mein itna waqt lagega, terrorism ko nipatne mein kitne saal 
lagengey? Aur yeh paribhasha na honey ke karan, yeh ‘good terrorism’ ‘bad terrorism’ chal raha hai. 
Terrorism terrorism hota hai. Mera desh toh 40 saal se terrorism ke karan pareshan hai nirdoshon ko 
maut ke ghat utaar diya jaata hai, hum duniya ko samjha rahein hain, duniya hamare pe sawaal khara 
kar rahi hai. Kuch mahine pehle, yahan pe stock market mein bamb phuta tha… iss karan pata chala ki 
Hindustan mein terrorism kya hota hai”.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LOzZt5B-tzI 
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same terror group (and also the same sponsor state, Pakistan). In the last line, it looks like 
he is almost blaming the US for being negligent in noticing terrorism in South Asia and 
that it is only after US itself became a victim that it realised that terrorism is a threat faced 
by other countries (especially India). There is clear urgency and frustration in his words 
as he feels that the world (or US) is not realising the need of the hour and collaborating 
with him to defeat terrorism and bring down those who sponsor and support it.  
This same frustration and disappointment are seen in his speech at the BRICS 
summit in 2020 as well.  
 
India has lost most soldiers in peacekeeping operations… Question are being raised on global 
governance institutions’ credibility and effectiveness. The main reason being there hasn’t been 
necessary changes in them with time. They are still based on 75-year-old values and realities of 
the world. Institutions like WTO, IMF, WHO should also be reformed, along with UN and BRICS. 
Terrorism is the biggest global problem right now. We should ensure that terrorists and nations 




Modi proves India’s dedication towards UN’s values by pointing out that it is the country 
that has lost most soldiers during peacekeeping missions. This should really indicate that 
Modi measures success from a security point of view and soldiers’ death is only an 
account of patriotism and a dedication towards fighting the enemy. He does not mention 
any policy measures his government took to take down terrorist groups, neither does he 
suggest any peace-talks with such terrorist organisations that might lead to some 
compromise. He is quick to point out that other global institutions are not doing their part 
in combatting terrorism, while conveniently ignoring the reasons as to why terrorism is 
increasing in India. This is the case in the previously mentioned speeches of Modi as well. 
None of these speeches contain any actual practical solutions that have a different 
approach other than sending the military at the border to fight the enemy, pointing to the 
fact that he has a traditional understanding of security and does not believe in peace talks 
or bilateral discussions. His speeches always blame Pakistan (indirectly) for being the 
 
14 “Peacekeeping operations mein sabse adhik veer sainik Bharat ne hi khoye hain…. Global governance 
ke sansthanon ki credibility, aur effectiveness dono par hi sawaal uth rahein hai. Iska pramukh karan yeh 
hai, in mein samay ke saath uchit badlav nahi aayein hai. Yeh abhi bhi 75 saal purane vishva ki maansikta 
aur vasktvikta par aadharit hai. UN ke atirikt kayi anya antarashtriya sansthayein bhi vartaman 
vastviktao ke anusaar kaam nahi kar rahe, WTO, IMF, WHO jaise institutions mein bhi suhdar hona 
chahiye. Aatankvaad aaj vishva ke saamne sabsi bari samasya hai. Hamein yeh sunishchit karna hoga, ke 
aatankvaad ko samarthan aur sahayata dene walon deshon ko bhi doshi thehraya jaye”.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=72o23BH_uw8 
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sponsor for terrorist groups in India and the international organisations for failing to 
combat terrorism. However, he never mentions how his government failed to address the 
rise in terrorism under his rule and how that might be an important issue to resolve first 
before accusing others for the failing state of affairs in his own country. His statement 
about terrorists and supporting nations being held responsible for their actions almost 
seems as if he understands terrorism and security as a black and white situation where is 
a winner and loser. Further, he refuses to believe that there might be other reasons for 
terrorism, like in the case of Kashmir where most casualties happen due to conflict with 
the central government. In that case it is not just the neighbouring state that aggravates 
the crisis but also the ruling party, by abrogating the autonomous status (which had 
already become nominal in the past few years), stationing hundreds of paramilitaries 
outside the homes of innocent civilians, subjecting them to tortures, taking away their 
basic human rights, and more.  
 Again, this is evident from his speech in 2019 right after the Pulwama attack and 
the subsequent counter attack by BJP.  
 
… I am extremely proud of my brave soldiers who, within 100 hours, have avenged the attack on 
their fellow soldiers by a major perpetrator and sent them to where they belonged. Our fight is for 
Kashmir and not against it. Few days back, what happened where it happened, whether it was a 
big incident or small, (what happened to) Kashmiri kids in some corner in India, is not the issue. 
This should not happen in this country15. – (Modi, 2019). 
 
The speech starts with him praising his soldiers yet again and boasting about how they 
defeated the terror groups from Pakistan within 100 hours. It is important to notice how 
he contradicts himself in just two lines. He states that the fight is ‘for’ Kashmir and its 
people and then in the same breath he states that it is not important to know if a Kashmiri 
child was hurt in some corner of the country but rather that something like this should not 
happen in India. This extremely arrogant speech encapsulates the very essence of BJP’s 
fight with terrorism. It is not that the party is concerned with casualties or peace, its focus 
lies within territorial integrity of India and its security forces. It is almost as if the military 
 
15 “Mujhe apne veer javaano par garv hai, jinhone 100 ghante ke bhitar hi apne saathiyo par huye hamle 
ke ek bade gunahgar ko wahaan pahuncha diya jahaan uski jagah thi. Hamari larai Kashmir ke liye hai, 
Kashmir ke khilaaf nahi hai. Pichle dino kahaan kya hua, ghatna choti thi ki badi thi, Kashmiri bachchon 
ke saath Hindustan ke kisi kone mein kya hua kya nahi hua, mudda yeh nahi hai, iss desh mein aisa hona 
nahi chahiye.   
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8QEWKfMXonk 
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has become the BJP’s bread and butter and it cannot go one step without relying on it. 
The party does not want to accept that there are non-militaristic measures that are also 
important when dealing with conflicts and terrorism. Also, he is quick to dismiss the 
plights of the Kashmiris right after stating that the party is fighting for them. He does not 
express concern for the Kashmiris lives and well-being, but starts off by commending his 
security forces and how the soldiers avenged the death of their ‘fellow mates’.  
 
How did Modi react to terrorism when he was the Chief Minister of Gujarat (Indian 
state)? This speech from 2012 will answer that.  
 
…  (to the then central government) where do these terrorists and Naxalites get their weapons and 
bombs from? It comes from foreign lands and the border is completely in your hands, border and 
security forces are in your control, first manage what is in your control and stop the terrorists from 
receiving weapons and bombs from foreign countries… we said terrorists receive money from 
foreign, the money transaction business is in the Indian government’s hands… This money that 
the terrorists receive from foreign countries is in your hands, the (regional) states have nothing to 
do with this, why don’t you stop it? … infiltrators from foreign countries come in the form of 
terrorists. … border, coastal security, BSF (Border Security Force), Army, and Navy is under your 
control, then how do these infiltrators enter? … the entire communication is under your control, if 
anyone writes an email or communicates, Indian government can interrupt them and receive 
information and you can stop them… those who flee to foreign lands and spread terror in India, 
we have the right to extradite them, you could not do that till now. First solve these five things and 
terrorism will be eradicated from its roots16. – (Modi, 2012)  
 
 
In a series of questions, Modi asks the governing Prime Minister in 2012 Dr. Manmohan 
Singh why it failed to curb terrorism in India. Let us take one question at a time. The first 
question, he blames the government for not managing the border and security forces 
efficiently which in turn lead to infiltration of terrorists. This therefore proves that border 
and security forces are under the central government’s control and they exercise all the 
 
16 “…Yeh jo aatankvadi hai, yeh Naxalvadi hai, unke paas shastra aur barood kahan se aata hai? Woh toh 
videsh ki dharti se aata hai, aur seema sampoorn roop se aapke kabze mein hai, seema aur suraksha bal 
aapke kabze mein hai, jo aapke kabze mein hai usko toh sambhalo, aur jo videsh se barood ata hai 
shastra aata hai aatankvadio ke paas pahunch jaatein hai, usko toh roko. Hamne kaha aatankvadio ke 
paas dhan aata hai, pura money transaction ka karobaar Bharat sarkar ke haath mein hai RBI ke under 
mein hai…. Yeh jo dhan videsh se aa kar aatankvadio ke paas jata hai, aapke haath mein hai rajya usme 
kahi beech mein nahi aate, aap usko kyun nahi rokte? … Videsho se ghuspethian aate hai, aatankvadi 
ghatnaye karte hai… seema’e aapke haath mein hai, coastal security aapke haath mein hai, BSF sena 
aapke haath mein hai, Navy aapke haath mein, yeh videsh se ghuspethiya kahan se ghus jate hai? Sara 
communication Bharat sarkar ke under mein hai, koi bhi agar telephone pe baat karta hai, email likhta 
hai, Bharat sarkar usko interrupt kar sakti hai, jaankariyan paa sakti hai aur rok sakti hai…. Videshon 
mein jo aataknvadi bhag chuke hain unko pratyaropan ke dwara Hindusthan lane ka hamein adhikar 
hai… ek baar in paacho’n cheezon par kuch kar ke dikhayiye aatankvad jarh se ukhad jayega”.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IfsnvRbK22A&list=LL&index=41 
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authority and are evidently responsible for whatever happens. He blames the PM for not 
tracking the money transactions from the foreign sponsors to the terrorists, further 
proving that the government has the knowledge of transactions between terrorist 
organisations and sponsors and can track down the source if it wants. Third question 
reiterates his first question asking the PM why he failed to monitor the boundaries and 
coastal security of the country, meaning the government has the responsibility to stay 
alert at all times regarding threats arising from such sensitive areas. Fourth question points 
out that the Indian government can track down communications and can even read what 
emails and other electronic forms of communications are taking place amongst the terror 
organisations and sponsors, and if done effectively, they can put a stop to it. Lastly, he 
brings up the case of extradite which is an important aspect of foreign politics. The reason 
why this speech is an important addition to the discourse is because Modi, in 2012, asked 
all the right questions to the presiding government regarding, and currently, he too seems 
to have failed at addressing all of the above-mentioned concerns.  
One of the most important reason given by the BJP for the revocation of the 
autonomy of Kashmir was of terrorism. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, Kashmir had 
the autonomy in all areas except communication, foreign relations, and defence, meaning 
it was not only possible for the BJP government to curb terrorism, it was also their duty 
to do so. These same questions should be asked to Modi now because the official 
statement provided by the party does not match up. If communications, defence, and 
foreign relations, all of the areas necessary to curb terrorism, was already in the control 
of the Indian government, what was the need to revoke the autonomous status, which was 
already reduced to a nominal state. Not only did the BJP government fail at managing the 
border, which is proven by the numerous infiltrations that Modi himself claims happened, 
he also blamed Pakistan for spreading terror and international organisations for failing to 
eradicate terrorism in India which should have been managed by the Indian government 
in the first place. As is clear from this really precise and sharp speech, he does not beat 
around the bush by blaming either Pakistan or international organisations, he presents his 
questions to the Prime Minister. He has a clear idea of how exactly terrorism works and 
what the solutions are, this means technically he (and his government) should be capable 
of handling the situation now that he is responsible for it. Also, in all of his speeches, 
Modi prioritises terrorism over every other issue, meaning this should be one of the top 
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security concerns for the government. Thus, the government is neither strategically 
incapable of managing terrorism, nor are they unaware of the powers they have regarding 
India’s security. They seem to be very well aware of the methods (extradition), and areas 
of control (communications, coastal and border security), then we can assume that the 
motive behind the revocation has nothing to do with terrorism.  
 
3.3. Securitising Kashmir 
 
As per the Copenhagen school, international security has a distinct agenda which can be 
understood by looking at it from the traditional military-political security point of view. 
What makes something a security issue when it is taken out of the ordinary and stated as 
a ‘existential threat to a designated referent object’. Also, because the state of affairs is 
shown to be extraordinary, the extreme measures are hence justified (Buzan et al. 1998). 
Securitisation of Muslims, as per Mavelli (2013), is done by placing ‘terror’ in the same 
sentence as ‘Islam’, which points towards the idea where both terrorism and Islam are 
combined together to present the existence of threat. It can be said in the case of Kashmir 
as well where the BJP discriminates the Muslims by presenting them as inherently 
conflicting, while also constantly pushing the narrative that terrorism is the biggest threat 
to mankind and that BJP is determined to eradicate terrorism from its roots. When put 
together, Kashmir thus embodies a land of Muslims where terrorism is rampant, thus is 
securitised.  
 
We have decided that it is not possible for the BJP to continue in the alliance government in Jammu 
and Kashmir. Restoring peace in Kashmir and encouraging fast development in Jammu and 
Kashmir, these were the twin objectives that we joined with PDP17. – (Madhav, 2018).  
 
Here we see that the BJP has already started laying the foundation of unrest in the region 
of Jammu and Kashmir by mentioning that peace was a goal that now seems difficult to 
achieve with the state. By saying these lines, they are indicating that it was the BJP that 
tried to bring in developments in the region but was unsuccessful because PDP (Jammu 
and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party) failed to agree to their objectives.  
 
 
17 “BJP withdraws alliance with PDP in Jammu and Kashmir: Shri Ram Madhav briefs media”,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QXdS0hnHCpM 
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The present scenario wherein there is increase in terrorist activities and violence in Kashmir valley, 
radicalisation is also on the rise, fundamental rights of the citizens that include the right to life and 
free speech is also in danger. – (Madhav, 2018).  
 
Through these lines, the speaker is establishing the security elements that need to be 
addressed. Mainly the increase in terrorist activities and radicalisation. These words are 
quick to catch the attention of the viewers and also sends across the message of unstable 
political affairs in the state that needs special attention. By saying that the fundamental 
rights (life and free speech) are also in danger, automatically alerts the audience that there 
is a state of emergency. Along with this, choosing words like ‘increase’, ‘on the rise’, 
also indicates that the issue is now becoming even more urgent.  
 
 Again, going back to an important element of the Copenhagen school, when an 
issue is presented as an existential threat, it is merely a securitising move. To successfully 
securitise an issue, it is important that the audience also accepts it, otherwise it will not 
receive the legitimacy it needs in order to justify the extraordinary measures (Buzan et al. 
1998). Further, Hansen (2006) writes that language as political always focuses on its 
possibility to produce and reproduce subjects and identities while excluding others. 
Therefore, linguistic practises often times takes an objective account of an identity and 
reproduces and reinforces it as per convenience.    
 
Bharatiya Janata Party is the ruling party and Narendra Modi is the Prime Minister, there is no 
possibility that Kashmir can secede from India. Just leave it, there is enough awareness in this 
country, doesn’t matter which party is in power, it can never separate from India… it is just a 
phase18. – (Shah, 2017).  
 
As we see in this above-mentioned quote, Amit Shah confidently speaks of the fact that 
Kashmir can never leave India. By mentioning that BJP is in power and Modi is the PM, 
he is stating that the power resides with them and there is no way that Kashmir can ever 
secede. The line ‘it is just a phase’ could be interpreted to indicate that the party was 
already in talks of revocation of the autonomy, which is not a surprise since it was a part 
of their manifesto since 1980s, and that this demand for separate statehood will soon be 
 
18 “Bharatiya Janata Party ki sarkaar hai, Narendra Modi ji Pradhan Mantri hai, koi sambhavna nahi hai, 
Kashmir Bharat ke haath se nikalne ka. Woh chorr dijiye, iss desh mein ab itni jagrukta hai ki kisi bhi 
party ki sarkar ho Kashmir kabhi Hindusthan se alag nahi ho sakti. Yeh ek phase hai”.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GYs8WwGuS8g 
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crushed by integrating Jammu and Kashmir into India. On the other hand, this could also 
be Shah’s way to downplay Kashmir’s struggle for self-determination. By calling it a 
‘phase’ he points out that this a childish game that holds no actual significance.  
 
BJP government definitely promotes a ‘zero-tolerance’ policy towards terrorism; however, this 
does not mean that entire narrative is changed. Is it not important that Jammu and Kashmir receive 
development, peace, educational institutes, healthcare centres, or playgrounds, better roads? The 
people of Jammu and Kashmir should demand development from their governor that matches the 
rest of Indian states… it is important to set a narrative that IIM establishes sooner, that medical 
colleges open up19. – (Shah, 2018) 
 
One of the things to remember about security is that the actors are given powers solely 
because they are the accepted voices of security, because they have the voice to describe 
security. However, this does not mean that the power is absolute. Also, a security 
argument will always discuss the possibilities of what might happen if we do not take the 
security action and what might happen if we do take it (Buzan et al. 1998). Here in Shah’s 
speech, we notice that he presents the audience with options to develop the state further 
which can only be done by completely eradicating terrorism. The security matter is 
presented with a logical solution wherein the audience would want to accept the proposals 
made because it conveys positive messages of development. It also clarifies that the 
security measures taken towards ‘zero-tolerance on terrorism’ is necessary which will 
only benefit the people of Jammu and Kashmir and that it is something the people of the 
state should demand from their governor. Like Guzzini (2011) writes, one of the most 
important aspect of securitisation is its ability to create meaning which is socially 
produced. Therefore, when Shah here points out that they are on a mission to eliminate 
terrorism from the region and that the people of Jammu and Kashmir should demand 
development from governor, he is basically looking for affirmations from the people who 
will validate his speech. The speech which was made a year before the revocation could 
be seen as a warm up exercise for the audience wherein, they realise that BJP has it in 
 
19 “Bharatiya Janata Party ki kendra sarkar, aatankvad ke khilaaf, zaroor zero tolerance ki neeti apna rahi 
hai. Magar iska matlab yeh nahi hai, ki pura narrative hi aisa banaya jaye. Kyun Jammu Kashmir ke liye, 
vikas, shanti, bachho ka rozgar, development, ya padhai likhai ki institution ya swastha ki sansthaye, ya 
khel ke maidan, raj marg, yeh Jammu Kashmir ke liye nahi hai? Main manta hoon mitron, samagrah 
Jammu Kashmir ki janta ne iss rajpyapal sashan se sabse pehli apeksha yeh rakhni chahiye ki Jammu ka 
vikas Bharat ke baki hisso jitna hi ho, hamara kaam yeh hai ke narrative set karein ke IIM jaldi chalu ho 
jaye, medical college jaldi chalu ho jaye”.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H466iot7oUU 
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them to give J&K a makeover and bring stability and peace in the region. This could be 
interpreted as BJP’s way to nudge the public into thinking that they have to appeal to their 
state ministers for development when in reality it is clear to everyone that the state relies 
on the Indian government for funding since private investments rarely get picked up due 
to the unstable environment. And because of this constant dependence on central 
government, the relation between local and national institutions are also critical, it dims 
the chances of a successful self-determination since the possibility that Jammu and 
Kashmir will receive the level of development that might kick start a self-sufficient state 
is highly impossible (Jones et al. 2010).  
 There is also a link between populist leaders and securitisation. This is because 
according to scholars, often it is not so much that insecurity generates populism but is 
rather the opposite where populism creates further insecurity. As Kurylo (2020), says, 
‘forging security problems and crises provides populists with the opportunities to 
(re)produce the very identity they claim to protect’. They (populist leaders) create a 
‘perceived threat’ through Othering which is drawn beyond the general idea of ‘us’ and 
‘them’ and moved further into ‘evil’ and ‘dangerous.’ Therefore, the two important 
elements that goes into creating the identity is demonising of the social group and the 
general animosity towards the elite (Kurylo, 2020). Similarly, Paterson and Karyotis 
(2020), explain that since identity is fluid and dynamic, securitisation in the case of 
migration can be understood to be ‘driven by how host societies articulate, negotiate, and 
delimitate their self-identification and relationship with out-groups, within a specific 
temporal and spatial context’, and this threat construction of the migrants is a top-down 
process wherein the multiple identities are suppressed to in turn promote a hierarchically 
superior national identity. Therefore, a successful securitisation is when limits are placed 
on identity and it is opposed to what it is not while being cast as a threat and get that idea 
accepted by the relevant group (Paterson and Karyotis, 2020).  
 
 While the case of Kashmir is not that of migration security, we can, nevertheless, 
connect the above-mentioned points to the crisis. To take the idea of threat construction 
through a top-down process where the multiple identities are suppressed in order to 
achieve a national identity is evident in the following speech by Amit Shah.  
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… we always had to mention that Kashmir is an integral part of India because of Article 370. This 
Article 370 was always an obstruction… till the time there is Article 370, Kashmir can never 
become an integral part of India. So now I can proudly say that Kashmir is finally an integral part 
of India. In a country there should be one symbol, one national flag, one leader, one legislation, 
one constitution, is the motto that the Bharatiya Jan Sangh’s workers have sacrificed their lives to. 
There cannot be two constitutions, two legislations, two leaders in one country were our slogan 
from Jan Sangh till now. Congress Minister, Rahul Gandhi says Article 370 is a political issue. 
For BJP the revocation of Article 370 was never a political issue, rather it was to make Mother 
India even more united. You see politics we see patriotism20. – (Shah, 2019) 
 
 
Note that he refers to Article 370 as an ‘obstruction’ pointing to the fact that it is because 
of this Article that Kashmir has been left undeveloped and was infiltrated with terrorists 
and could not officially be a part of India. Just to clarify what the said article entailed, the 
state of Kashmir had the autonomy in all matters except finance, defence, foreign affairs 
and communications. Revocation of the Article thus implies that rest of the Indian 
population can now buy properties in Jammu and Kashmir. While BJP claims that this 
means foreign direct investments will flourish in the region, Kashmiris are wary of this 
statement and fear losing their identity and culture due to demographic transformation 
(Aljazeera, 2019). Therefore, what Shah claims as ‘integral’ is seen as threat to identity 
by the Kashmiris, the very groups BJP is trying to protect. Before 2019 the Kashmiris 
were worried the increasing terrorist activities and militancy in the region took away basic 
human rights and lead to the death many innocent civilians, now there is an increased 
threat of the demographic instability. As Kurylo (2020) rightly pointed out that populism 
creates insecurity. His statements about one national flag, one legislation, one leader, and 
one constitution reveal the extreme nationalistic background of the political party on 
which they base their policies. This connects with Paterson and Karyotis (2020) where 
they point to the idea of suppression of multiple identities through the promotion of 
national identity. The BJP is notorious for promoting Hindu values and cultures while 
simultaneously supporting hate crimes against Muslim minorities. Modi has been called 
 
20 “Kashmir ke liye bolna parhta tha kyunki dhara 370 badha bankar khadi thi…. Jab tak dhara 370 hai , 
Kashmir kabhi Bharat ka abhinn ang nahi ban sakta… aaj main garv ke saath keh sakta hoon Kashmir 
Bharat ka abhinn ang hai. Ek desh ke andar, ek nishaan, ek rashtra dhvaj, ek pradhan, ek vidhaan, ek 
sanvidhaan, yeh teen’o naara lekar Bharatiya Jan Sangh ke karya karta o ne balidan di. Ek desh mein two 
nisha do pradhan do vidhan nahi chalenge hamara naara tha… Congress ke neta, Rahul Gandhi kehte hai 
ke dhara 370 raajnitik mudda hai… Kashmir mein se 370 ko hatana Bharatiya Janata Party ke liye 
raajnitik mudda nahi hai, Bharat Maa ko ek aur akhand banane ka sankalp hai…. Aapko isme raajniti 
dikhai parhta hai humko isme deshbhakti dikhayi parhti hai”.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0i1io6a3r_w 
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out by foreign media for propagating right-wing Hindutva politics in a country whose 
constitution upholds secularism and freedom of religion and whose founding father, 
Gandhi, was assassinated because of his secular views (Foreign Policy, 2020). The BJP’s 
aim to create an ‘Akhand Bharat’ (complete India) translates strongly to the ideas of 
nationalism and patriotism. This is what Shah refers to at the end of his speech where he 
speaks of the revocation as a ‘patriotic’ move rather than a political move. One can say 
patriotism is BJP’s trump card that the party members use to justify any policy/decision 
and/or securitisation. By moving the issue from politics to patriotism, Shah plans to reach 
out to the civilians and mobilise them so that they receive their approval for such a drastic 
step. By doing this, he plays the ‘us’ vs ‘them’ card wherein if someone disagrees with 
this move, they are automatically labelled anti-national who sides with the neighbouring 
enemy, Pakistan and is strategizing ways to divide the nation.  
 
3.4. Key Findings 
 
There are three main ideas that emerge from the above analysis with respect to BJP and 
Modi. First, the othering of Muslims. The fact that India is a secular nation that upholds 
every religion as equal is something the BJP does not agree with. For them India is a land 
of Hindus as they were the early settlers who were conquered by the barbaric Mughal 
Rulers (Muslims). This is the foundation of the communal divide that the BJP based their 
politics on. A narrative is set that the Muslims of India are, like their ancestors, savages 
and ‘predatory’ in nature and their values do not align with that of Hinduism. They are 
shown to be the opposite of intelligent and sensible Hindus. Through this the Muslims 
have already been portrayed as an ‘alien force’ that is inherently in conflict with the Hindu 
value; and if at all a Muslim has to reside in India, they must abide by the Hindu values 
and traditions. Not only are they considered disloyal to India because of their perceived 
allegiance with Pakistan (Muslim country), they are also securitised on the basis of their 
population. BJP spreading made up facts that the Muslims will soon take over the Hindu 
majority, thus rendering them minorities in their own country creates fear and resentment 
amongst the Hindus, thus widening the existing divide. Further, the BJP’s firm belief that 
a Hindu cannot be a terrorist, even though independent India’s first terrorist and Mahatma 
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Gandhi’s assassinator was a Hindu from the RSS, establishes the idea that Hindus are so 
loyal to India that they cannot possibly engage in any terror activity.  
 Second, Modi has always prioritised terrorism, be it while addressing the nation 
during election campaigns or on international platforms like the UN and BRICS. It is 
evident through his speeches that that terrorism for him has always been a major security 
concern. When he addresses the audience at UN’s 70th year, his frustration is apparent. 
He does not want to waste time defining terrorism, he wants the world to know that there 
is a common enemy and the state that is sponsoring it (Pakistan). He even compared 9/11 
with 26/11 (Mumbai terrorist attacks carried out by lashkar-e-Taiba), just to get the 
audience’s attention and pointing out the fact that the enemy is known by everyone; the 
fact that Pakistan is a safe haven for all terror groups and in order to curb terrorism the 
international organisations need to act on it. On top of that, the dependency on military 
has also increased. His public speeches have one thing in common, addressing the Indian 
army and congratulating them on their act of bravery. He even measures India’s success 
by the number of martyrs, pointing out that since India has lost the most soldiers during 
peacekeeping operations, they are indeed a victim of terrorism. Modi uses the Indian army 
as a shield to legitimise his actions. It is worth noticing that in the 2019 manifesto, internal 
and external security jumped to the first page, as compared to that 2014, and it also 
stresses that the party will further strengthen the army. Plus, the very first proposal of 
‘zero tolerance towards terrorism’ in their 2019 manifesto is a clear indication that the 
party will pick up pace in its fight against terrorism.  
 Third, Modi’s speech from 2012 itself exposes BJP’s true intentions. In the 
speech, Modi clearly accepts that the Prime Minister of the country holds the authority to 
control border and defence, communications, and foreign relations. He questions then PM 
Manmohan Singh as to why he failed to curb terrorism when all the major security areas 
are under his control. However, when Modi himself became Prime Minister, none of 
speeches addressed the fact that his own party failed to achieve the goal to curb terrorism. 
His constant blame game against Pakistan is exhausting. Not only did he not take any 
responsibility as a PM who has been in power for six years, he also tried to justify the 
revocation of Article 370 on terrorism, when the article mentions that the government of 
India has the authority in the areas of communication, foreign relations and defence; thus, 
making it clear that the central government should be able to curb terrorist activities 
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without even modifying the Article, let alone revoke it. This makes it evident that the 
revocation of the autonomous status has nothing to do with the rising terrorism. It is also 
evident from Amit Shah’s constant insistence that Kashmir has always been an integral 
part of India and can never secede from it. He blames Article 370 for the poor 
development of Kashmir, believing that the article acted as an obstruction and that the 
people of Kashmir deserved to live like the rest of the Indians. Further, in his speech from 
2019, right after the revocation, he is proud of the fact that Kashmir is finally a part of 
India officially. According to him, India should not have two constitutions or two leaders. 
He does not mention anything about terrorism, but stresses on ‘one nation’, indicating 
that their goal was inherently to integrate Kashmir into India so that it becomes easier to 
govern the state, which also means that now Kashmir shall have to follow the constitution 
of India (and not Kashmir), which will thus also allow for the rest of the Indians to buy 
properties in Kashmir, which was previously not possible due to 35A; meaning this will 
inevitably create a shift in the demographic since Kashmir is the only Muslim dominant 





The main aim of the thesis was to analyse the underlying motive of the BJP government 
behind the revocation of the autonomous status through securitisation theory. It thus 
aimed to answer the research questions: What explains the revocation of Kashmir’s 
autonomy; and, how has the speech acts enabled securitisation of anti-Hindu elements in 
Indian society and justified the measures taken in the case of “state of exception”. This 
has been answered by examining the speeches of the BJP leaders, who have securitised 
Muslims in India by creating a ‘state of exception’ and stressing on the fact that their 
values do not match with that of the Hindus and thus, they pose a threat to India. Further, 
by analysing Modi’s speeches on terrorism using discourse analysis, it is established that 
the BJP is highly militaristic in its ambitions and methods and relies on the military for 
internal and external security. Once we have these two elements it is clear that the motive 
behind the revocation was beyond the official statements made by BJP; since Kashmir is 
the only Muslim majority state of India, it was imperative that the party integrates the 
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state into India, further, the fact that terrorist activities in the valley are common gave the 
party the validation it needed in order to justify their actions to the Indian audience. 
Therefore, the BJP combined their Hindutva politics and militaristic, ‘zero tolerance 
towards terrorism’ goals. Further, it is also evident from Modi’s 2012 speech that since 
communication, defence, and foreign policy is under central government’s authority, the 
justification of the revocation on the grounds of terrorism thus falls short.   
 The ongoing conflict of Kashmir is a heavily researched topic and scholars have 
made significant contributions towards the issue. The latest development in the crisis in 
the form of revocation of Article 370 is relatively new and current literature focuses on 
the implication it has on Kashmir’s secessionist demands, India’s external and internal 
policies, as well as the tension between India and Pakistan. This thesis contributed 
towards the conflict by filling the gap on how the state of Kashmir has been securitised 
on the grounds of rising terrorism. Further, by analysing BJP’s public speeches through 
the lens of discourse analysis, it filled the gap in literature by addressing the policy 
implications that political speeches have in the context of Kashmir. Through this thesis, 
it is shown that not only was the revocation achieved through unconstitutional means, but 
that the BJP government’s underlying motives behind the decision was different from 
what it had officially stated. Future research on the Kashmir conflict could benefit from 
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